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I. INTRODUCTION 
When the Supreme Court announced its unanimous verdict in Pegram 
v. Herdrich, 1 a case concerning the rights of a plaintiff to sue an Health 
Maintenance Organization (HM0)2 in federal court under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),3 the media haled it a 
victory for the managed care industry.4 The plaintiff, Cynthia Herdrich, 
alleged that the HMO bribed its physicians with a financial incentive plan 
that induced them to deny her needed care to save the plan money.5 She 
sued the HMO for breaching its BRISA fiduciary duty.6 In finding for the 
defendant HMO, the Court held that the HMO was not the BRISA plan and 
that its medical treatment decisions were not governed by BRISA fiduciary 
1. 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000). 
2. Health Maintenance Organization, is an insurance business structure for reimbursing the 
cost of medical services. While the generally accepted term is MCO (managed care organization) 
this paper will follow the Supreme Court's use of HMO. 
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 , 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (2000). 
4. Jane Crawford Greenburg, Court Spares HMO from US Suits, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 2000, 
at A� ("In a resounding victory for the managed care industry, the U.S. Supreme Court un
.
ani�ously ruled Monday that a former legal secretary could not use a federal law to sue her Ilhno1s HMO for offering its physicians financial incentives to keep down costs."). 5. Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2147. 
6. Id. 
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duty provisions.7 HMO stocks immediately soared8 because the Court's 
opinion took notice that while there are risks associated with rationing 
medical care, 9 "no HMO organization could survive without some 
incentive connecting physician reward with treatment rationing." 1° Further, 
the court was not prepared to adjudicate the wis9om of medical care 
rationing.11 The Court's language clearly removes the threat of ERISA 
fiduciary liability for managed care decisionmaking.12 
While Pegram is the first decision by the Supreme Court to directly 
consider a plaintiffs claim that the routine business practices of the HMO 
industry violated ERISA's standards for fiduciary conduct, 13 we question 
7. Id. at 2151. 
8. High court rules patients cannot use federal law to sue HMOs over doctor bonuses. 
www.kcsw.com 6/13/00 (Cigna jumped 21/4 to 903/4. Aetna, which was upgraded by SaJomon 
Smith Barney on Monday, rose 3114 to 705/8.). Cf Bruce Jaspen, Illinois HMO Profits Ailing, CHI. 
TRIB., Dec. 1, 1999, at Bl (noting that HMO profitability was depressed for severaJ reasons 
including failure to control costs). 
9. Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2150 ("rationing necessarily raises some risks while reducing others 
(ruptured appendixes are more likely; unnecessary appendectomies are less so)"). 
10. Id. 
11. Id. ("[A]ny legaJ principle purporting to draw a line between good and bad HM Os would 
embody, in effect, a judgment about socially acceptable medicaJ risk. A valid conclusion of this sort 
would, however, necessarily tum on facts to which courts would probably not have ready access: 
correlations between malpractice rates and various HMO models, similar correlations involving fee­
for-service models, and so on."). 
12. Pegram has far reaching business implications because virtually all of the medical 
insurance provided by employers is covered by ERISA. An important exception includes medical 
insurance coverage for workmen's compensation and church plans. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1003 (1997). 
Coverage (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) and in sections 201, 301, and 
401 [29 USCS §§ 1051, 1081, and 1101), this title shaJI apply to any employee 
benefit plan if it is established or maintained-( I) by any employer engaged in 
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or (2) by any 
employee organization or organizations representing employees engaged in 
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or (3) by both. (b) 
The provisions of this title shall not apply to any employee benefit plan if-(1) 
such plan is a governmental plan (as defined in section 3(32) [29 uses § 
1002(32)]); (2) such plan is a church plan (as defined in § 3(33) [29 uses § 
1002(33)]) with respect to which no election has been made under section 410(d) 
of the lnternaJ Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 410(d)]; (3) such plan is 
maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen's 
compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws; 
(4) such plan is maintained outside of the United States primarily for the benefit 
of persons substantiaJly all of whom are nonresident aliens; or (5) such plan is an 
excess benefit plan (as defined in§ 3(36) [29 USCS § I 002(36)]) and is unfunded. 
29 u.s.c.s. § 1003 (1997). 
13. No Supreme Court case has thus far addressed the issue of bodily injury or wrongful 
death arising from the administrative malfeasance of an ERISA plan. Several such cases have been 
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whether the stock market analysts are correct that the Supreme Court has 
immunized HMO business practices. It is the premise of this Article that 
in its holding, the Pegram Court also removed the ERISA preemption
.
bar 
to state law claims for medical malpractice and breach of state fiduciary 
law. Paradoxically then, although the defendant HMO in Pegram won, the 
managed care industry lost. 
In Part II, we review how the HMO industry was initially able to mold 
ERIS A's preemption of state law into a shield that provided the industry 
with protection from liability when it denied needed medical �are �d �ow 
this has been narrowed by Pegram. In Part ill, we explore the 1mphcauons 
of the Pegram rationale for why HM Os are not liable for breach of ERIS A 
statutory fiduciary duties and how this triggers liability for state law 
claims. HMO medicine has unique features-such as allowing medical 
decisions to be made remote from a patient's bedside-that do not fit well 
into state medical malpractice law and are better analyzed under common 
law, as opposed to ERISA, fiduciary duty theory. Consequently, 
application of state tort law may become quite complex . We conclude that 
after Pegram, HMOs will be subjected to increased litigation under both 
of these areas of state law. 
The common thread in this analysis is that medical care decisionmaking 
is ultimately made by individual physicians who are subject to claims 
under state tort and fiduciary law. To the extent that these physicians are 
controlled by an HMO or other managed care organization, that entity will 
be legally responsible for the physician's actions through vicarious liability 
or through agency theory. 14 All managed care depends on controlling 
physician be�avior, either directly or through physician medical directors, 
thus r�gulation . of the behavior of these physicians will regulate the 
managmg of patient care. We recognize, however, that this is only relevant 
to.plans that seek to manage medical decisionmaking. Plans may escape this regulation by limiting their role in the decisions about individual 
patients and the quality of individual patient care, as did insurers before the 
adve�t. of managed care. To the extent that this disengagement frees phys1c1ans to exercise their own conscience about medical care 
de�i�ionmakin.g, it can improve patient care. To the extent that it results in 
shiftmg the nsk of insurance to physicians without regard to their 
denied cert' · · 1 d' . 
toran, me u mg Weems v. Jefferson-Pilot life Ins. Co. 663 So 2d 905 (Ala) arr. denied, 516 U.S. 971 (1995) I � 
. . . . 
d . 
. 
. 
· n eems, the Supreme Court let stand an Alabama Supreme Court ec1s1on upholding a breach of fidu 
· d · · · · · · c1ary uty action under ERISA based on tnJ unes to the plamuff 
�
���
!':
b
an e
�
pl?
�r's failure to pa� insurance premiums. Further, the Alabama Supreme Court reac 0 e ERISA fiduciary duty can support punitive damages and held that state courts may try such cases. See id. 
14. While this Article is written 1·0 te f h . . 
care roti · 
rms o P ys1c1ans. the same theories apply to other health 
P essionals to the extent that state law allows them to make impcndent medical decisions. 
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competence and performance, it will hurt the quality of patient care. For 
these reasons, we conclude that the most important consequence of 
Pegram is the empowerment of state regulators. 
II. HMO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY LoSES THE BRISA PREEMPTION 
SHIELD 
On Labor Day 1974, President Ford signed the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act [BRISA] to facilitate contracting for national 
employers by eliminating the need to have to contemplate fifty different 
state laws. To achieve such a goal, BRISA preempted all state law that 
"related to" an employee health or welfare plan. 15 But within a decade of 
ERISA's passage, double-digit medical expense inflation under the 
prevailing fee-for-service [FFS] reimbursement system fushed health care 
costs to prohibitive levels for American businesses. 1 Jn an attempt to 
resolve such medical inflation, the nation embraced managed care-the 
delivery of health care modulated b y  utilization review and financial 
incentives as the method to reduce medical costs. Stimulated by new 
demand, the insurance industry produced a number of managed care 
products of which the quintessential is the HMO. HMOs are the most 
aggressive in applying utilization review and financial incentives to control 
medical costs. Additionally, an HMO operating under BRISA had a 
competitive advantage in the market place because ERISA's preemption 
of state tort law served to shield the HMO from liability from medical 
malpractice claims. Soon the majority of medical insurance products 
offered by employers, as part of a benefit package; were HMOs organized 
under ERIS A. 17 
15. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (West 2000). 
16. Before the 1970s, medical decisionmaking was driven by the Hippocratic ideal of 
providing the patients with the smallest of benefits regardless of cost. Unfortunately, this maxim 
becomes unrealistic in a world where supplies are l imited and medical costs are skyrocketing. Mark 
Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 
137 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 431, 435 (1988). In the seventies, the bills of the Great Society and the Vietnam 
War became past due, thereby producing an inflationary pressure on the American e conomy. Medical 
inflation was fwther aggravated by an Arab oil embargo. All costs rose; and medical costs in 
particular. To help curb medical costs President Nixon signed the HMO Act in 1973 ( 42 U.S.C. 300e-
10). The following year President Ford signed ERISA which provided that qualified medical plans 
would be immune from state malpractice laws, and thereby acquire an economic advantage over non­
qualified plans. See Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Physicians in Managed Care: A 
Multidimensional Analysis of New Trends in Liability and Business Risk, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 443 
(1996). 
17. Edward B. Hirshfield et al., Structuring Provider-Sponsored Organiwtions, 20 J. LEGAL 
MED. 297, 300 (1999) (citing Levit et al., National Health Spending Trends in 1996, 17 HEALTH 
AFF. 35, 36 (1998 )) (Presently, BRISA organized HMOs account for 60% of the non-Medicare 
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ERISA's preemption of state law meant that any state tort law, 
including medical malpractice, that "related to" an ERISA plan was 
preempted.18 Accordingly, in the early years of.�anaged care� �he �ourts had to determine whether a denial of care dec1s1on was a utihzat1on of 
benefits decision (hence "related to" the ERISA plan) or medical 
malpractice (that was not "related to" the .P�an). The first.c.ou�s to ta�kle this problem viewed a denial-of-care dec1s10n to be a utihzation review 
decision by the ERISA plan, and not a source for medical malpractice.19 
This freedom from medical malpractice liability gained by an HMO under 
ERISA provided a qualified employer benefit plan with a competitive 
advantage in the market place becaus e  the HMO would not have to 
purchase insurance coverage.20 Because individual state tort 
. 
law 
interference with the operation of a national employer's plan was precisely 
the evil that ERISA sought to prevent through the use of preemption, as 
applied to health care, ERISA preemption was soon used as a shield to 
protect the HMO from exposure to medical malpractice liability. 
Thus, the perceived "positive" of cost efficient managed care was that 
it would control medical inflation and therefore help to make national 
employers more cost competitive in the new global market. However, the 
downside of more "cost efficient" health care21 is that managed care is 
insurance market.). 
18. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (finding no 
implied right to private action); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (deciding that 
ERISA preempts New York human rights law). 
19. The leading cases holding denial of utilization review are Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 
810 (Ct. App. 1986) and Corcoran v. United Healthc are, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992). 
20. Richards & McLean, supra note 16, at 451. 
. 
21. Whether managed care provides for more cost efficient health care delivery is debatable. 
Ahce A. Noble & Troyen A. Brennan, The Stages of M anaged Care Regulation: Developing Better 
Rules, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &L. 1275 (1999) (discussing consumer backlash when managed 
care products fail to control cost and provide what is conceived to be less than ideal care); William 
M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Heal th Care, 99 
C
Oi:-�
· L. REV. 1 701, 1704 (1999) ("Not surprisingly, corporate intrusion into health care 
dec1s1ons tu�ed out to be as unpalatable as government intervention, prompting the current 
backl�h agamst managed care and renewing interest in preserving professional ideals through 
regulation. Rather than asserting an alternative paradigm, this most recent upheaval is searching for 
a way to manage managed care-to control cost and maintain access without leaving life-and-death 
decisions to executives and accountants."); Charles Van Way, Death of Managed Care?, 
METROPOLITAN MEDICAL SOCIETY OF GREATER KANSAS CITY BULLETIN, Mar. 2000, at http:!/www.metromed.org/ ("It is a central assumption of the Great Health Care Revolution that 
medical care can be managed. So we have tried. We've tried very hard. A lot of businessmen and 
managers have become wealthy, but has it worked? Well, no. It's failed. In fact, it's failed in a 
spectacular enough fashion to seriously annoy the voting public."); Thomas M. Burton. Examining 
the Table: Operation that Rated Hospital Was a Success but the Patient Died WAIL ST J Aug 
23 1999 . . . 
' 
• . .. . 
• 
• at Al . (If there was a true cns1s m the delivery of heath care in America i.e. a true 
demand for "qualit " health · · ' Y care, 1t would be provided, perhaps at a higher cost, but in many cases 
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perceived to distort the loyalty of the physician providers. 22 Under fee-for­
service reimbursement, the traditional theory was that the interests of the 
doctor and patient were aligned; thus, more medical care was seen by both 
the patient and the physician to be good medical care. 23 Patients 
appreciated the extra attention, while the physicians received lavish 
remuneration. In contrast, under managed care, the interests of the doctor 
and patient are clearly disassociated. In fact, the doctors' and patients' 
interests have become "triangulated" such that the third corner of the 
triangle is occupied by an HM0.24 The addition of the HMO to the doctor­
patient relationship inexorably produces a paradigm shift in the relation of 
the doctor to the patient, which undermines the relationship of trust 
between the doctor and the patient.25 Ultimately, whether a particular 
patient is over or under treated rests upon the professional integrity of the 
treating physician. 26 
Congress in 1974, which had only the year before passed measures to 
aid the infant manage care industry, 27 could not have imagined that the 
enactment of BRISA could distort the fundamental unit of health care 
delivery, that is, the doctor-patient relationship. But by the mid-1990's, the 
implications of the Supreme Court's expansive view of "related to" as a 
trigger for ERIS A preemption28 was recognized in multiple industries. 29 
it could be done at the same or lower costs-if the plans had a long enough time horizon so that the 
full costs of improvident short term cost saving strategies were incorporated in the plan costs.). 
22. Neade v. Portes, 710 N.E.2d 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362 
(7th Cir. 1998); Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997); Lancaster by Lancaster v. Kaiser 
Found. Health Plan, 958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
23. In practice, more care is not necessarily good care, since it might place the patient at 
needless risk because the physicians might have a financial incentive to perform care that was 
beyond their expertise. Also, even if arguably medically necessary, the care might be unwanted but 
accepted anyway because many patients have trouble resisting the moral authority of their 
physician. See Elliot S. Fisher & H. Gilbert Welch, Avoiding the Unintended Consequences of 
Growth in Medical Care, 281JAMA446-53 (1999). 
24. Richards & McLean, supra note 16, at 447-50 (providing a more detailed discussion of 
the structure and functioning of managed care organizations). 
25. Evidence that patient's need to have trust in their physicians may be observed in the 
public's favorable response to US Healthcare' s granting physicians more autonomy. Laura Landro, 
Living With Change The Decision ls Yours: Doctors Are Starting to Embrace Information 
Technology and Its Changing Their Relationship With Patients, W AU.ST. J., Oct. 18, 1999, at R 13. 
26. Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S. Ct. 2143, 2149 (2000) ("[l]n an HMO system, a physician's 
financial interest lies in providing less care, not more. The check on this influence (like that on the 
converse, fee-for-service incentive) is the professional obligation to provide covered services with 
a reasonable degree of skill and judgment in the patient's interest."). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-IO (2000). 
28. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); Shaw v. 
Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). 
29. De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medic. & Clini cal Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997); see also 
California Div. Labor Standards Enforcementv. Dillingham Const., Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997); New 
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Once some aspect of state law was found to be "related to" an employee 
benefits plan, that aspect of state law was nullified by ERIS A's preemption 
c lause. With respect to health care, preemption of state tort law meant that 
a patient-beneficiary who sustained bodily injury due to a denial-of-care 
administrative decision of an BRISA plan could be left "without a 
remedy"30 because ERIS A limited relief to equitable remedies-that is, non 
pecuniary relief.31 As c onstrued by Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance 
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 
(1995). 
30. E.g., Dockter v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1993 US App. LEXIS 4385, at *5-6 (9th Cir. 1993) 
("[U]nder the law, however, ERISA preempts state law claims even if the plaintiff is left without 
a remedy.") (citation omitted). See also Olson v. General Dynamics Corp., 960 F.2d 1418, 1422-23 
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding state law claims are preempted under ERISA and "[d]eclining to devise 
a federal common law remedy even where plaintiff is left without a remedy''). 
31. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). Prior to Pegram, the 
"Russell Doctrine" shaped the court' s view of compensating an ERISA beneficiary for harm due 
to denial of care. Id. Russell alleged that she had been wrongfully denied medical coverage by her 
insurer and consequently suffered financial embarrassment when such coverage had to be acquired 
on the spot market. Id. at 136-37. The issue distinguishing Russell from Pegram is that the plaintiff 
in Russell never sustained any physical injury; her injury was purely financial. A monetary award 
for Russell's damages was held to be inconsistent with the "legislative intent and consistency with 
the legislative scheme." Id. at 145. The Russell court followed the reasoning of Cort v. Ash, 422 
U.S. 66, 78 (1975) in "determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly 
providing one." Russell, 473 U.S. at 136-37. 
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was 
enacted,-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? 
Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to 
create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying 
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And 
finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area 
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a 
cause of action based solely on federal law? 
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted). Specifically, "[t]he assumption of inadvertent omission [of 
legal remedies] is rendered especially suspect upon close consideration of ERISA's interlocking, 
interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme, which is in tum part of a 'comprehensive and 
reticulated statute."' Russell, 473 U.S. at 146 (citing Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)). Russell considered the BRISA plan and the fiduciary to be a 
single entity, adding "Congress did not provide, and did not intend the judiciary to imply, a cause 
of action for extra contractual damages caused by improper or  untimely processing of benefit 
claims ." Id. at 148. Moreover, ERISA "already provided specific relief for the sort of injury the 
plaintiff had suffered (wrongful denial of benefits)." Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 5 10 
(19�6). For Russell, the proper remedy for wrongful denial of benefits was for the plaintiff to. file 
a suit for recovery of the benefit. Russell, 473 U.S. at 144. Such a suit is based on 29 U.S.C. § 1133 
(2000) ("Claims pr�edure: ln accordance with regulations of the Secretary, every employee benefit 
plan shall-( I) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for 
benefits under the plan has been denied, setting forth the specific reasons for such denial, written 
in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant, and (2) afford a reasonable opportunity 
2001) UABILITY FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DtnY 9 
Co. v. Russell,32 the combination of ERISA preemption of state tort law 
and the limited options for granting relief under ERISA was translated to 
mean that victims of wrongful denial-of-care decisions were left without 
remedy for harm suffered by the administrative malfeasance of an BRISA 
plan. 33 This anomalous situation was made worse because patients of non­
ERISA qualified plans who were denied medical care were free to seek 
compensation from their insurance plans. 34 More fundamentally, the states 
were denied the power to address these problems through administrative 
regulation of qualified plans because state regulation of benefits was also 
preempted. 
A. The "Related to" Problem Found in ERISA Preemption 
As any curbstone philosopher can tell you, the problem with using 
"related to" as a trigger for ERISA preemption is that everything is related 
to everything else to one degree or another.35 Hence, any state law which 
was remotely "related to" an employer's benefit plan, including laws 
concerned with patient safety were preempted by ERISA. By the mid-
1990s, the expansive nature of "related to" was causing unanticipated 
consequences in a number of industries. The tide changed with the 
Supreme Court's 1995 opinion in New York State Conference of Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. 36 After Blue Cross, 
state laws that were of general applicability, laws which only indirectly 
to any participant whose claim for benefits has b�n denied for a full and fair review by the 
appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim."). Accordingly, the Russell court 
declined to "tamper" with the statutory remedies. Russell, 4 73 U.S. at 147. Because Russell's actual 
damages were limited to pecuniary losses, the damages are analogous to those that Congress had 
anticipated as occ�rring secondary to the administrative malfeasance of a pension fund. Given the 
facts at hand in Russell, the Court appropriately limited the plaintiffs remedies under ERISA. 
However, the injury sustained by plaintiffs like Cynthia Herdrich represent an unprecedented form 
of injury caused by breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty. Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2143. Unfortunately, 
the failure to distinguish financial damage from bodily injury damage after a patient is denied 
medical care pervades legal analysis ofERISA medical administrative malfeasance cases prior to 
Pegram. 
32. 473 U.S. 134 ( 1 985). 
33. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 note (citing Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 
(D. Mass. 1 997) ("ERISA's civil enforcement provision .. . does not authorize recovery for 
wrongful death, personal injury, or other consequential damages caused by improper refusal of 
insurer or utilization review provider to authorize treatment.")) . 
34. Fox v. Health Net. of Cal., Cause No.219692 (Cal. Super. Ct .. Riverside City, 12123/93). 
35. California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Const. Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 
336 (1997). "I think it would greatly assist our function of clarifying the law if we simply 
acknowledged that our first take on this statute was wrong; that the 'relate to' clause of the pre­
emption provision is meant, not to set forth a test for pre-emption, but rather to identify the field 
in which ordinary field pre·emption applies." Id. 
36. 5 1 4  U.S. 645 (1995). 
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impact on the BRISA plans, would no longer be preempted �nde! ER.I��· 37 
The key question left unanswered by the Blue Cross, Calif omza Division 
of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, Inc. ,38 and 
DeBuono39 line of cases was precisely which laws are too tenuously related 
to employee benefit plans so as not to trigger ERISA preemption. After 
Blue Cross the appellate courts struggled with where to draw the line 
between "related to" and too tenuously related with respect to HMO 
administrative malfeasance in health care delivery. 
One of the first cases after Blue Cross to address this issue was the 
La.ncaster by l.Ancaster v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan40 case, which 
involved the medical care given to an eleven-year-old child with 
headaches.41 Beginning in 1991, the child was taken to her primary care 
physician [PCP], an emf:loyee of Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, which 
operated under BRISA. 2 While treated under the Kaiser HMO for five 
years, no diagnostic tests were perfonned and the patient was never 
referred to a neurologist for evaluation. 43 The child was treated 
symptomatically with adult strength narcotics until 1996, when the child's 
school performance began deteriorating.44 The child's school psychologist 
urged a neurologic evaluation, which revealed that forty percent of the 
child's brain had been replaced by a tumor.45 
Kaiser is an interesting example of the use of branding in HM Os. While 
most commentators know of the Kaiser model in California, with its large 
physician panels and access to a broad variety of hospitals, in other states 
Kaiser is often organized very differently, with very small panels of 
physicians, limited specialty coverage, and inadequate access to hospitals 
and clinical facilities. Thus, a Kaiser plan in Virginia, where this case took 
place, may be very different from the California model, which accurately 
reflects the public's perception of Kaiser. This leads to a potentially 
troubling consumer expectations. This is critical to Lancaster because the 
issue became one of denying her proper testing and referral to a specialist. 
Moreover, these plans have two corporate entities. The insurance plan is 
set up as a non-p�ofit corporation and Kaiser emphasizes this in its public 
relations
. 
campaigns. The physicians work for a separate for-profit 
corporation, become stockholders, and thus share in the profits. The two 
.. 37. See, e.g., De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997); D11lmgham Const., 519 U.S. at 316. 
38. 519 U.S. 316 (1997). 
39. 520 U.S. 806 (1997). 
40. 958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 1139. 
43. Id. at 1139-40. 
44. Id. at 1140. 
45. Id. 
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corporations are tightly intertwined, with the plan buying care from the 
physician corporation. The physician corporation, in turn, pays the 
physicians incentives "whereby physicians receive bonuses for avoiding 
excessive treatment and tests."46 The key factors driving these incentive 
schemes, which are used in most HMOs and are the focus of a lot of 
litigation, are the costs of sending patients outside the plan, running tests, 
and admitting and treating patients in the hospital, especially in hospitals 
that are not controlled by the plan. Care rendered by in-plan physicians 
does not increase costs, therefore in-plan referrals are generally not 
penalized, while out-of-plan referrals are. Thus, the defendant physician 
in Lancaster would see his bonus reduced if he sent the patient to a 
specialist outside the plan or if he ordered diagnostic tests. In the 
California style Kaiser plan, this is not a critical issue because the plan has 
adequate access to specialists and testing facilities. However, in a location 
with few physicians and facilities, the same incentive scheme has become 
very dangerous. 
Negligent care was clearly rendered to the Lancaster child, and formed 
the basis for a classical medical malpractice claim. Additionally, the 
plaintiff argued that the same facts established a breach of fiduciary duty 
by the physician and the plan. This allegation was based on the negligent 
establishment of an "[I]ncentive Program and for intentionally and 
knowingly concealing its existence from the plaintiffs."47 Kaiser 
"characterized this claim as attacking an administrative decision of the 
plan, not a medical decision,"48 which the Lancaster court accepted. The 
Lancaster court then looked for precedent in a line of cases involving 
utilization review,  which concluded tha t  administrative decisions involving 
benefits are preempted under ERISA.49 Since such fraud claims are based 
on state law, "[p]ermitting these claims to proceed would undermine the 
congressional policies that underlie ERISA. Absent preemption, for 
instance, benefit plans would be subject to conflicting directives from one 
state to the next . .. . "50 The La.ncaster court then limited the plaintiffs 
recovery to classic medical malpractice against the physician and vicarious 
liability against the plan, a decision based upon Kaiser's characterization 
of physicians as plan employees through its corporate branding of the 
physician group. The Lancaster court rejected the breach of fiduciary duty 
based on the incentive scheme and suggested that "there is no remedy 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 1146. 
48. Richards & McLean, supra note 16, at 457. 
49. Lancaster, 958 F. Supp. at 1144 (citing Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, 88F.3d1482 
(7th Cir. 1996)). 
50. Id. at 1150. 
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against an BRISA plan using an improper incentive plan or even hiding the 
incentive plan from its patients."51 
• 
Lancaster is illustrative of a body of case law that had developed m the 
previous ten to fifteen years. The courts took the �iew that ERISA's 
preemption of state law allows for the BRISA quahfied health plan to 
engage in administrative malfeasance either by arbitrary denial o� care� or 
by the creation of disingenuous physician incentives, without tnggenng 
state law liability for any bodily injury caused to a patient-beneficiary. 
Hence, while the physician in Lancaster could be sued in state court for the 
failure to make a proper referral, the fact that the physician's conduct was 
directly caused by HMO enticement was neither a defense to the physician 
nor the basis for a cause of action against the HMO. Moreover, the 
La.ncaster court allowed the plaintiff a cause of action against Kaiser 
which was predicated on vicarious liability for holding out the physicians 
as "Kaiser" physicians. Thus the Lancaster court distinguished direct plan 
liability and vicarious liability for medical malpractice. In contrast to direct 
liability, which the Lancaster court considered to be barred under ERIS A 
preemption, BRISA was not a barrier to an action for vicarious liability. 
B. Using Fiduciary Law to Solve the "Related to" Problem 
In addition to state tort law, fiduciary law is used to modulate the 
professional behavior of physicians, thereby indirectly influencing HMO 
behavior. Thus, independent of the medical malpractice approach of 
Lancaster, the issue of whether breach of fiduciary duty was "related to" 
ERIS A plans arose as the plaintiffs lawyer tried to collaterally attack 
HMO administrative malfeasance. Shea v. Esensten52 and Neade v. 
Portes53 analyzed the degree to which fiduciary law was related to an 
employee benefit plan. While separated by nearly two years, Shea and 
Neade have very similar facts and the legal theory in Neade was clearly 
?ased on the hol�ing in Shea. Patrick Shea was a forty-year-old executive 
m the co!11puter industry who had a history of  heart disease in his family, 
but was .m good health personally.54 While on a business trip he suffered 
c?est pai.ns, and, upon his return, he sought out his family physician for a 
d1�gnostic worku�.s� As described in the plaintiff's complaint, Mr. Shea's 
primary care phys1c1an (PCP) reassured him that he had nothing to worry 
about, as he was too young to have a heart attack.56 His pains persisted, as 
5 I . Richards & McLean, supra note 16, at 458. 
52. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997), appeal after remand, Shea 
v. Esensten, 208 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2000). 
53. 710 N.E.2d 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
54. Shea, I07 F.3d at 626. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
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did the reassurances.57 After several months of trusting, and after being 
dissuaded by his physician that it was necessary for Mr. Shea to spend his 
own money to see a cardiologist, Mr. Shea died of "heart failure. "58 Upon 
investigation, what was on its face a simple case of grossly negligent 
medical care became a complex BRISA case of breached fiduciary 
obligations.59 The appeals court held that under ERISA, Mr. Shea' s widow 
did have a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty since the physician's  
incentive program, in essence, bribed the physician-fiduciary not to 
provide medical care. 60 Interestingly, the Shea court never explicitly stated 
just who was the fiduciary;61 whether it was a particular physician or a non­
medical administrator of the BRISA plan. The Shea court remanded the 
case without specific instructions on the nature of the remedy.62 
57. Id. 
58. Id. Since this case arose from a dismissal, the court only explored the plaintiffs facts. It 
is possible that they did not paint an accurate picture of the care provided by defendant and that a 
different picture will emerge as facts are developed with further discovery. 
Id. 
59. Id. 
Unknown to Mr. Shea, Medica's contracts with its preferred doctors created 
financial incentives that were designed to minimize referrals. Specifically, the 
primary care doctors were rewarded for not making covered referrals to specialists, 
and were docked a portion of their fees if they made too many. According to Mr. 
Shea's widow Dianne, if her husband had known his doctor earned a bonus for 
treating less, he would have disregarded his doctor's advice, sought a 
cardiologist's opinion at his own expense, and would still be alive today. 
60. Id. at 629. 
[W]e believe Mrs. Shea has stated a claim against Medica for breaching the 
fiduciary obligation to disclose all the material facts affecting her husband's health 
care interests. When an HMO's financial incentives discourage a treating doctor 
from providing essential health care referrals for conditions covered under the plan 
benefit structure, the incentives must be disclosed and the failure to do so is a 
breach of ERISA's fiduciary duties. 
Id. ; see also Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hosp., WL405055 at •5 (E.D.Pa., Jun 30, 1998) (discussing 
Shea). 
6 1 .  Shea, 107 F.3d at 625. The fact that the Shea court did not define the fiduciary is key to 
understanding Pegram. The citations used to support the Shea opinion suggest that fiduciary 
common law was contemplated. This w .. i11ld have been appropriate under ERISA because ERISA 
incorporates fiduciary common law. In contrast, the Pegram court considered only statutory 
fiduciary duty as established by ERISA. 
62. Although Shea was unprecedented as a breach fiduciary duty cause of action arising under 
ERISA, Shea implicitly contemplates damages for bodily injury arising from medical administrative 
malfeasance, and recognized that an incentive program that corrupts the judgment of a fiduciary is 
far from unheard of under BRISA. See also Dasler v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 694 F. Supp. 624, 634 (D. 
Minn. 1988) (holding defendant liable for breach of fiduciary duty where incentive program 
1 4  FLORIDA LA W  REVIEW 
[Vol. 53 
Similar to the facts in Shea, Anthony Neade was approximately thirty­
seven-years-old in 1990 when he began to show the classic symptoms of 
coronary artery disease, including chest pain radiating into his arm and 
shortness of breath.63 Neade had a family history of heart disease, w as 
overweight, suffered from hypertension, smoked, and had a high 
cholesterol count.64 While in the hospital, Neade underwent various tests, 
including a thallium stress test, which was interpreted as normal.65 
Following his discharge from the hospital, Neade continued to experience 
chest pain, and like Mr. Shea, was assured that his chest pain was not 
cardiac in origin. On one such occasion a doctor taking call for Mr. 
Neade' s PCP evaluated Mr. Neade, and recommended the "gold standard" 
for the evaluation of coronary artery disease: coronary angiography. 
However, Mr. Neade' s PCP, without any re-evaluation, terminated further 
diagnostic testing.66 Ultimately, Mr. Neade suffered a massive myocardial 
infarction caused by coronary artery blockage, and died nine days later.67 
The care rendered to Mr. Neade was sub-optimal, since he should have 
received further medical evaluation.68 In its review of the case, the Neade 
court recognized that an action for breach of fiduciary duty could arise 
from the same set of facts that support a cause of action for medical 
malpractice. 69 
Two factors emerge as common threads in Lancaster, Shea and Neade. 
First, the alleged medical malpractice was not a single mistake, based on 
information from a single patient encounter, but a systematic failure to re­
evaluate the initial diagnostic decision in the face of symptoms and 
complaints by the patient that were incompatible with the diagnosis. 
Second, re-evaluation of the patient would have required spending plan 
resources for hospitalization, additional testing, and/or out-of-panel 
resulted in excessive trading in security); Anweiler v. American Blee. Power Serv. Corp.,  3 F.3d 
986, 991 -92 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that defendant breached fiduciary duty by failing to provide 
complete material information concerning the methods of reimbursement); Ries v. Humana Health 
Plan, Inc .
• 
No. 94 C 61 80, 1 995 Lexis 16592 at •to (N.D. Ill., Nov. 8, 1 995) (citing 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ I � 04(a)( l )
.
(A)� ("fidu�iary' s.covert profiteering at the expense of insureds is inconsistent with its duties of acting solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries'"). 
63. Neade v. Portes, 7 1 0  N.E.2d 418, 421 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 999). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. Th�lium studies have a false positive rate o f  approximately 20% for detecting 
coronary artery disease when compared with coronary angiography. Id. 
66. Id. Even after the PC� requested a consultatiw� examination by a part-time physician, the 
PCP elected not to Proceed wtth coronary angiography choosing instead to rely on the reported 
results of the thallium scan. Id. 
67. Id . 
. �8. Se�, e.g . •
. 
Macdonald v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 1430 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (finding that 
a s11rular patient history should have alerted the physician to the patient's high risk of a heart 
attack). 
69. Neade, 110 N.E.2d at 426. 
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expertise which would have thereby increased the cost to the plan and 
decreased the physician's reimbursement. Under FFS, which tends to err 
on the side of too much/unnecessary care, it is very likely that the patient 
would have received the hospitalization, testing, and specialist referral. 
While the PCP might be equally incompetent in both scenarios, the 
involvement of other professionals and the additional test information 
would make the patient's condition much harder to ignore. 
In contrast, several factors distinguish Lancaster from Shea and Neade. 
The most important distinction is the consideration given to the degree of 
fiduciary duty owed by the physician to the patient under BRISA. The 
word "fiduciary" does not even appear in the court' s analysis of Lancaster. 
In contrast, the court's analysis in Shea is heavily focused upon the 
fiduciary duty owed by physicians, especially the obligation for physicians 
to conduct themselves with good faith and undivided loyalty to their 
patients. 
Second, Lancaster viewed denial of care decisions as being a utilization 
and review decision and thus not a medical decision. From the Lancaster 
court's vantagepoint, managed care health plans provide two independent 
functions; "namely that of health care insurer and that of medical services 
provider. "70 The Lancaster court concluded that health plans only make 
administrative decisions and not medical decisions because such decisions 
"cannot be stretched to imply that [a defendant] went beyond the 
administration of benefits and undertook to provide [the decedent] with 
medical advice."71 For the Lancaster court it was only natural that denial 
of medical care decisions should fall under the heading of utilization and 
review because: 
The absurd consequences of concluding otherwise confirm 
the correctness of this conclusion. BRISA plans are required 
to provide a participant or beneficiary written notice of a 
denial of benefits and an opportunity for a full and fair review 
of that denial by an appropriate plan fiduciary . . . . .The ERISA participant or beneficiary denied benefits under ht� or 
her plan can then seek judicial review of that specific 
administrative denial . . . .  Thus, if every instance of negligent 
treatment by a physician were construed as an administrative 
denial of a claim for plan benefits, then in every such case the 
patient would have the right to notice and review with !espect 
to that medical treatment decision, followed by a heanng and 
judicial review with respect to each "denial" of a plan benefit. 
70. IAncaster, 958 F. Supp. at 1 144. 
71 .  Id. at 1 148 n.33 (quoting Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat' I Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th 
Cir. 1993)). 
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In short, under Lancaster, utilization and review decisions, including 
denial of care decisions, are to be analyzed separately and independently 
from medical decisions. 
To the Shea court, a "denial of care" decision is a medical decision, 
rather than an allocation of resources issue. 73 Interestingly, the Shea court 
cited the same case cited by the Lancaster court when it recognized the 
case at hand as a medical decision rather than a utilization and review 
decision.74 Because physicians in a managed care environment made 
medical decisions, the physician had a "fiduciary obligation to disclose all 
the material facts" to the patient.75 In implying that physicians are 
fiduciaries under ERISA, the Shea court took notice that some injuries 
have irrevocable consequences. 76 A utilization and review decision, when 
made in the context of the administration of a pension plan, can be litigated 
for years without fear that a party will suffer physical injury. But, as the 
tragedies of the Shea, Neade, and Herdrich well illustrate, time is critical 
in medical decision cases and delay in treatment can have irreversible 
consequences. 
The final factor which distinguishes Lancaster from Shea and Neade 
was the degree to which the court believed the plaintiff had an adequate 
remedy. The Lancaster court concluded that the plaintiff' s medical 
malpractice posed "no ERISA questions because BRISA does not apply to 
medical care decisions made by treating physicians."77 Moreover, the 
Lancaster court explained that the plaintiff' s vicarious liability claim 
72. Id. �3. Shea v. Esensten, 1 07 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1 997); see, e.g .. Murphy v. Bd. of Med. 
Exa� rs, �49 P.2d 530 (A�z. Ct. App. 1 997). Dr. Murphy, an Arizona licensed physician, was the 
medical director for a national HMO and in that role authorized pre-certifications for medical 
treatment. See Murphy, 949 P.2d at 532. When pre-certification was denied, a patient would have 
t
E
o pay
_
out-o
_
f-pocket for the denied treatment. See id. However, when the Arizona Board of Medical 
xanuners issued Dr. Murphy an ad · l f · · · · 
d . . . 
visory etter o concern regarding "an mappropnate medical 
ec
;�on which could have caused harm to a patient," he objected. Id. at 534. He claimed that he 
crnedou . _
not 
l
be
d 
censured by the licensing authority since he was not engaged in the practice of 
icme. 
· at 535 The Arizona Su c · 
· 
work of a medical d' . 
pre�. ourt disagreed, finding that when the administrative 
medical director is m
::::tor :.luded ��isions that affected the care of individual patients, the 
administrative oversight
ng m �cal decisions, and therefore can be subject to the jurisdiction of an 
comnuttee. /d. at 535-36 
74. See Shea, I 07 F 3d at 627 ( 't' K hi 
· 
. 04 (8th Cir. 1 993)) ("we
. 
h h Id 
ct mg � v. Lm�oln Nat'! Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 301 -
ernployer' s health plan fall =�fo�ab�hat �l�ms o f  �sconduct against the administrator of an 
75. Id. at 629. 
Y wtthm ERISA s broad preemption provision"). 
76. Id. 
77 · Richards & McLean supra 1 6  • note • at 456, (citing Lancaster, 958 F .  Supp. at 1 1 43). 
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against the plan based on ostensible agency was not preempted by BRISA, 
therefore, the plaintiff was left with a clear remedy against the plan. 78 
Lancaster envisioned that the plaintiff would receive some compensation 
on a tort theory from the state court upon remand.79 In contrast, the Shea 
court observed that "the district court correctly decided that ERISA 
preempts Mrs. Shea's state-law claims."80 Thus, the Shea court must have 
contemplated that its award for breach of fiduciary duty was to be the sole 
form of relief available to Mr. Shea' s widow. 
C. Applying ERISA Statutory Fiduciary Law to Solve the "Related to " 
Problem 
Cynthia Herdrich filed suit against her physician and Carle Clinic for 
breach of fiduciary duty, arising from medical care provided by an ERISA 
qualified plan. 81 Defendant Carle Clinic "operate[ d] a pre-paid health 
insurance plan which provide[ d] medical and hospital services"82 and 
employed Ms. Herdrich's  physician, Dr. Pegram. Examination of Ms. 
Herdrich by Dr. Pegram identified a six by eight centimeter abdominal 
mass, which was inflamed.83 Dr. Pegram allegedly "delayed instituting an 
immediate treatment of Herdrich," per the policies of the plan.84 To make 
matters worse, 
[d]uring this unnecessary waiting period, Herdrich' s  health 
problems were exacerbated and the situation rapidly turned 
into an "emergency"-her appendix ruptured, resulting in the 
onset of peritonitis. In an effort to defray the increased costs 
associated with the surgery required to drain and cleanse 
Herdrich' s ruptured appendix, Carle insisted that she have the 
procedure performed at its own Urbana facility, neeessitating 
that Herdrich travel more than fifty miles from her 
neighborhood hospital.85 
As such, the delay "subjected [Ms. Herdrich] to a life threatening illness, 
a longer period of hospitalization and treatment, more extensive, invasive 
and dangerous surgery, increased hospitalization costs, and a greater 
ingestion of prescription drugs."86 Similar to the plaintiffs in Lancaster, 
78. LAncaster, 958 F. Supp. at 1 1 49; see also id. at 1 148 n.32. 
79. Id. at 1 1 50. 
80. Shea, 107 F.3d at 627. 
8 1 .  Herdrich v. Pegram, 1 54 F.3d 362, 364-65 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd 1 20 S. Ct. 2143 (2000). 
82. Id. at 365. 
83. Id. at 374. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 378. 
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Shea and Neade, Herdrich's complaint alleged "the intricacies of the 
defendants' incentive structure . . .  [provided for] an incentive . . .  for 
[physicians] to limit treatment."87 Moreover, such incentives meant that 
[a] doctor who is responsible for the real-life financial 
demands of providing for his or her family sending four 
children to school (whether it be college, high school or 
primary school), maldng house payments, covering office 
overhead, and paying malpractice insurance might very well 
"flinch" at the prospect of obtaining a relatively substantial 
bonus for himself or herself. 88 
In analyzing Herdrich, the appellate court noticed that "the defendants 
had the exclusive right to decide all disputed and non-routine claims and 
thus were in fact, ERIS A fiduciaries. "89 In fact, Dr. Pegram owed fiduciary 
duties not only to Ms. Herdrich due to the nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship, but also to her employer, Carle Clinic, and to the ERISA plan 
itself. Dr. Pegram' s  multiple fiduciary duties were not mutually exclusive 
and frequently led to conflicts of interest, as the doctor attempted to serve 
multiple masters. The Herdrich court concluded that the incentive plan 
could reasonably have corrupted the fiduciary duty owed by the physicians 
and the plan to the p atient beneficiary. 90 The appellate court then remanded 
the case for a determination of damages along guidelines outlined by the 
court.91 The Herdrich court directed that a determination of damages for 
breach of BRISA fiduciary duty was to be indexed according to the 
unnecessary medical expenses incurred by the plan.92 Requiring that 
damages be structured in such a manner was clearly within a literal reading 
of the determinations of damages to an ERIS A pension plan. 93 
Shea, Neade, and the appellate decision in Herdrich all attempt to 
resolve a major anomaly in the law: when a health plan's administrative 
malfeasance results in bodily injury to a beneficiary, the traditional 
87. Id. at 372 (emphasis omitted). 
88. Id. at 370. 
89. Id. at 380. 
90. Id. 
9 1 .  Id. at 33 1 .  
92. Id. 
93. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1 1 32; see also Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 65 1 .  660 (7th Cir. 1 992) 
�Extr��ontractual compensatory damages are not available under ERISA). ERISA allows a 
h
��cipant or beneficiary· · · to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce 
th
is nghts under the terms of his plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of e plan." Id. at 654 Pursuant t ti al 1· . · o na on po icy, Congress wished to protect the pension plans from 
:n
�xpec
l 
ted and excessive financial liability. Accordingly, Congress prescribed that damages were o e c early definable and hence predictable. 
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remedies available to such a beneficiary are markedly different if the plan 
is an BRISA qualified plan. 
In all of the above cases, the HMO administering an ERISA health plan 
used financial incentives to modify their physicians ' judgment. Such 
financial arrangements are frequently kept secret from patient-beneficiaries 
by the use of a "gag rule" clause in the physician provider's contract.94 
Whether such business practices are used alone or in tandem as part of a 
system with other behavior modifiers, their purpose is the same-to 
establish dual loyalties in physicians. The problem with dual loyalties in 
physicians is, of course, that the need to serve multiple masters 
perniciously corrupts the physician' s decisionmaking process. 
D. Pegram's Narrowing of ERISA Preemption 
Against this confusing and contradictory back drop of appellate cases,95 
the Supreme Court accepted Pegram for review. There are two keys to 
understanding Justice Souter's opinion. The most important i s  the Court' s 
narrow view of what constitutes an employee health plan under ERISA.96 
This excludes the HMO from ERIS A preemption because the provision of 
medical care is not the ERISA plan. Second, after Pegram, an action 
against a physician or HMO for breach of statutory fiduciary duty, as in 
Herdrich, is no longer available to plaintiffs, but the court did not limit the 
application of fiduciary common law actions against either of these two 
categories of defendants. Consequently, the Court has left the door open 
for fiduciary common law actions and remedies to be used as a method to 
remedy wrongful HMO denial of care decisions. 
The Pegram court noticed that "'ERISA's definition of an employee 
welfare benefit plan is ultimately circular: any plan, fund, or program . . .  
to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established . . .  for the 
94. A typical gag clause prohibits a contracting physician from making disclosures that could 
undermine the trust the patient has in the physician and/or insurer. As the physician generally has 
as much to gain as the HMO by keeping incentive plans secret, it is mere speculation that the simple 
prohibition of such clauses in a physician contract will induce the physician to have a more open 
discussion with patients about financial incentives. However, because employers provide the 
majority of commercial insurance, ERISA preemption has in the past nullified the anti-gag rule 
statutes. In light of the recent holding in Pegram, gag rules may now be enforceable across the 
board. 
95. Confusion exists in these cases as to which law was applicable. Shea and Neade 
contemplated that the physician involved had breached fiduciary common law duties, while 
Herdrich contemplated that the physicians involved had breached ERISA statutory fiduciary 
obligations to their patient beneficiaries. The contradiction of these opinions is best illustrated by 
observing the differing remedies which were contemplated by the Lancaster and Shea courts. 
96. Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S. Ct. 2 143, 2 1 5 1  (2000). ERIS A covers employee benefits and 
pension plans. While ERISA comprehensively regulates pension plans, it provides only minimal 
details on the management of these benefit/health plans. 
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purpose of providing . . . through the purchase of insurance or 
otherwise . . .  medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits. "'97 To the 
Pegram court, the word "plan " referred "to a scheme decided upon in 
advance."98 In the delivery of health care, this means that the ERISA plan 
is limited to "a set of rules that define the rights of a beneficiary and 
provide for their enforcement. Rules governing collection of premiums, 
definition of benefits, submission of claims, and resolution of 
disagreements over entitlement to services are the sorts of provisions that 
constitute a plan. "99 In other words, as it interfaces with the delivery health 
care, the ERISA plan is limited to the contractual relationship between the 
employer and employee that outlines the employees' benefits and not the 
contractual rules by which the HMO operates. 100 The structure of an HMO 
is not an BRISA plan, nor is the operation of an HMO necessarily part of 
the HMO plan. To the extent that operation of the HMO is directly dictated 
by the plan, such operations would be part of the plan. This situation could 
only arise where a self-insuring employer was operating the HMO 
themselves. 101 Because the HMO itself is removed from the employer­
employee benefit contract, the HMO' s  contractual relationships that 
motivate its physician providers are even more removed from the plan. The 
remoteness of the HMO-provider contractual relationship served as the 
foundation for the Pegram court to c onclude that physician incentives are 
too tenuously connected to the ERISA plan to be "related to" the plan. 102 
However, to the extent that an HMO is acting as a fiduciary agent of the 
plan, the HMO might still owe the plan and its beneficiaries certain duties 
under ERISA. A fiduciary under BRISA is defined as anyone who wields 
"discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of [an ERISA] plan. " 103 The use of the word "discretionary" 
was to bring all persons involved in making administrative decisions for 
BRISA plans into a common regulatory scheme. When Congress enacted 
ERISA, it "intended that this statutory definition of 'fiduciary' be broadly 
interpreted."104 This meant that one could become an BRISA fiduciary 
97. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002{1 )(A)). 
98. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1 879 (2d ed. 1 957)); see also 
Pet�r D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function, and Managed Care Torts: Achieving 
Fairness and Equity in ER/SA Jurisprudence, 35 HOUSTON L. REV. 985, I 050 ( 1 998) . 99. Pegram, 1 20 S. Ct. at 2 1 5 1  (citing Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co., 940 F. 2d 97 1 ,  974 
(5th Cir. 1991 )). 
1 00. Id. "[11he provisions of documents that set up the HMO are not, as such, an ERIS A plan, 
but the agree�ent betwee� an HMO and an employer who pays the premiums may . . . .  " Id . 
. 
1 0 � . Th1s would be m accordance with ERISA's "deemer" clause, 29 U.S.C.A. § J 1 44[c], 
which 1s beyond the scope of this Article. 
1 02. Pegram, 1 20 S. Ct. at 2 1 55-56. 
1 03.  Id. at � 1 5 1  (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1 002(2 1 )(A)(iii)). 
citi
�
04. �erdnch v. Pegram, 1 54 F.�d 362, 370 (7th Cir. 1998), rev 'd 1 20 S. Ct. 2 1 43 (2000) ( g Chamnan of the House Comnuttee on Education and Labor, 1 20 CONG. REC. 3977, 3983 
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without having a fonnal contractual relationship with the beneficiary. 105 
The statutory definition of a fiduciary under ERIS A reflects the realization 
by Congress that it would need the business expertise of the employers to 
design BRISA-qualified plans. With respect to pension funds for 
employees, the employer had an obvious conflict of interest. By defining 
the ERIS A fiduciary on the basis of discretionary authority, Congress 
recognized that the contractual relationship between the employer and 
employee would be inadequate to safeguard funds in a pension plan, hence 
the plans would have to be policed statutorily. Historically, the common 
law had policed contracts by finding that a power party owed fiduciary 
obligations to the other party.106 Congress' statutory modification of 
fiduciary common law was simply an attempt to tailor this ancient body of 
law to a creature of the twentieth century . 107 But in so doing, Congress had 
accepted that its statutory fiduciaries would, out of necessity, have divided 
loyalties. 
In making a medical decision, a health care provider' s judgment is 
guided by personal experience and accumulated medical knowledge. Given 
that discretionary means "a power or right conferred upon them by law of 
acting officially in certain circumstances, according to their own judgment 
and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others," 108 
it is clear that in making a . medical decision the physician uses 
discretionary judgment. Thus according to BRISA, whenever a health care 
provider exercises discretionary judgment to provide a medical service, 
that provider would become an ERIS A fiduciary.109 Importantly, since the 
(Feb. 25, 1974), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974, at 3293). 
105. Id. ("[A) party's fiduciary status hinges not on whether it is named in the plan agreement, 
but rather on whether it satisfies the statutory definition of a fiduciary in section l 002(21 )(A) of 
ERISA."). 
106. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary law., 7 1  CAL. L. REV. 795, 801 ( 1983) (citing HENRY MAINE, 
ANCIENT LAW 169-70 ( l st ed. 1 861 )). 
. 107. Id. The need to modify the fiduciary common law was driven ultimately by two factors. First, the common law recognized few relationships to be fiduciary. These limited relationships 
would not have covered all the parties that would have access to the pension funds that Congress 
sought to protect. Id. at 805. Second, divided loyalties were anathema to fiduciary common law. 
Id. at 81 1 .  But as noted above, the employers who were to be "conscripted" into managing the plans 
would have divided loyalties. 
108. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 466 (6th ed. 1 990) . 
. . 1�. The Shea court never explicitly declared the treating physicians to be fiduciaries, but it 
is implted. Health care decisions involve matters of life and death, and an ERISA fiduciary has a 
duty to speak out if he or she "knows that silence might be harmful." Shea v. Esenster, 1 07 F.3d 
625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Bixler v. Cent. Penn. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 1 2  F.3d 
!292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 (1 959). Also, 
[t]his kind of patient necessarily relies on the doctor's advice about treatment 
options, and the patient must know whether the advice is influenced by self-
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mere exercise of discretionary judgment over the benefits of an BRISA 
plan makes an individual a statutory ERI�� fiduciary, 1 10 all m�di�al 
service providers to ERISA patie�t-ben�ficianes are_ 
ERISA �duc1�1es 
regardless of their contractual relat1onsh1p to the medical plan itself. In 
short, because of ERISA's broad definition of a fiduciary, 1 12 every 
physician involved in the delivery of medical services could be �  ERISA 
fiduciary whose decisions could be subject to breach of fiduciary duty 
actions. The potential for the federal courts to become clogged by breach 
of fiduciary duty actions under ERIS A that were predicated on a denial of 
care decision was an unspoken policy motive for the Pegram court to 
conclude that physicians and other health care providers, including HM Os, 
are not ERISA fiduciaries. 1 1 3  
ERISA also incorporates fiduciary conunon law. Thus, "[r]ather than 
explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other 
fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the 
general scope of their authority and responsibility." 1 14 At common law "[a) 
fiduciary relationship exists when the parties are under a duty to act for or 
give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the 
serving financial considerations created by the health insurance provider. The 
district court believed Seagate's employees already realized their doctors' 
pocketbooks would be adversely affected by making referrals to outside 
specialists. Even if the district court is right, Seagate's employees still would not 
have known their doctors were penalized for making too many referrals and could 
earn a bonus by skimping on specialized care. 
Shea, 1 07 F.3d at 628-29. 
1 1 0. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 5 1 6  U.S. 489, 498 ( 1 996) "[A] 'person is a fiduciary with respect 
to a plan' and therefore subject to BRISA fiduciary duties, 'to the ei1tent' that he or she 'ei1ercises 
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration· of the plan." Id. (citing 
BRISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1 1 02 ( 1 997)); see also 29 U.S.C.S. § I 1 02 ( 1 997); Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 
1 1 56, 1 1 62 (4th Cir. 1 996) ("Concept of fiduciary under ERISA is broader than common law 
concept of trustee; it includes not only those named as fiduciaries in plan instrument, or who, 
pursuant to procedure specified in plan, are identified as fiduciaries, but any individual who de 
facto performs specified discretionary functions with respect to management, assets, or 
adminis�ration of plan."); advisory notes accompanying 29 U.S .C.S . § 1 1 06 ( 1 997) (citing Reich 
'!· Hosking, 20 E.B.C. I 090 (E.D. Mich. 1996)) ("Individual can be held liable as ERISA fiduciary 
if he or she exercises discretionary authority, or possesses discretionary authority.").  
1 1 1 .  Herdrich v. Pegram, 1 54 F.3d 362, 371 (7th Cir. 1 998), rev 'd 1 20 S.  Ct. 2 1 43 (2000). 
I 1 2. Id. at 370 (citing 1 20 CONG. REC. 3977, 3983 (1 974), reprinted in, 2 LEGISLATIVE �!STORY OF THE :8MPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 , at 3293 ( 1 974)) � Congress, when it enacted BRISA, intended that this statutory definition of 'fiduciary' be broadly 
interpreted."). 
1 1 3. Pegram v. Herdrich, 1 20 S. Ct. 2 143,  2 1 58 (2000) ("But we have seen enough to know 
that ERISA was not enacted t f h · · ti . 
ou o concern t at phys1c1ans were too poor to be sued or in order to 
�erahze �alpractice litigation in the name of fiduciary duty for any other reason'.") . 
. 2 L
1 4· Vanry, 5 1 6  U.S. at 496 (quoting H. R . REP. No. 93-533 at 3-5 1 1 - 1 3  ( 1 97 3 )  repri'nted m EGISlA TIVE HIS ' ' ' TORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1 974. 
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relationship."m Patients have limited contractual rights, 1 1 6  while the 
physicians who arbitrate the patient' s medical care exercise power in a 
non-reciprocal manner. 1 17 Consequently, it is to be expected that physicians 
are fiduciaries. In fact, the physician-patient relationship has long been 
deemed one with a fiduciary character. 1 1 8  "The inherent necessity for trust 
and confidence requires scrupulous good faith on the part of the 
physician."1 19 Moreover, "[a] physician occupies a position of trust and 
confidence as regards his patient-a fiduciary position." 120 The Missouri 
Supreme Court opined that "the confidential bond between a doctor and 
patient is a fiduciary relationship."121 In our society "a physician occupies 
a position of trust and confidence as regards his patient-a fiduciary 
position . . . .  This duty of the physician flows from the relationship with 
his patient and is fixed by law-not by the contract of employment."122 
Currently, most jurisdictions have found physicians to be fiduciaries. 123 
The most significant difference between ERISA's statutory definition 
of a fiduciary and the way in which the common law views a fiduciary is 
the degree to which a fiduciary may have divided loyalty. ERISA 
contemplated that the statutory fiduciary might have divided loyalties. 124 
1 15 .  Associated Indenmity Corp. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 9 1 8  S. W.2d 580, 596 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1996) (citing Stephanz v. Laird, 846 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Tex. Ct. App. 1 993)). 
1 1 6. Frequently, as demonstrated in Shea, an employer contracts with an insurer to provide 
for medical coverage. Consequently, the employee is presented a health benefit plan where the 
specifics of coverage have already been determined. Alternatively, i f  the patient purchases medical 
insurance directly from an insurer, the patient receives what in essence is an adhesion contract. 
1 17. While the doctor or insurer may be solicitous of the patient-beneficiary's wishes, hopes 
and desires, the decision to render medical care at present is entirely within the preview of the 
physician and insurer. 
1 1 8. Saulenas v. Penn, 192 N.E. 42, 43 (Mass. 1 934); see also Warsofsky v. Sherman, 93 
N.E.2d 612, 614 (Mass. 1950); Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216, 222 (N.M. 1 997) (referencing 
Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients From Their Physicians, 55 
U.Pm. L. REV. 29 1 ,  349 ( 1 994)) ("Several treatises on fiduciary law name the physician-patient 
relationship as a fiduciary one and the courts have tended to concur."). 
1 19. Hunter v. Brown, 484 P.2d 1 1 62, 1 1 66 ( 1 971 ) (citing Lockett v. Goodill, 430 P.2d 589 
(Wash. 1967). 
1 20. Brandt v. Med. Def. Assoc., 856 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo. App. 1 992); see also Moore v. 
Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1 96 1 )  (stating the exact proposition). 
1 2 1 .  Brandt, 856 S.W.2d at 670 (citing State ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389, 393 
(Mo. 1989)); see also State ex rel. McCloud v. Seier, 567 S.W.2d 127, 1 28 (Mo. 1 978) (finding that 
the physician' s undivided loyalty is to his patient). 
122. Moore, 345 S.W.2d at 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961)  (citing Parkell v. Fitzporter, 256 S.W. 
239 (Mo. 1 923)). 
123. Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 2 1 6, 222 (N.M. 1997) (referencing Mary Anne Bobinski, 
Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients From Their Physicians, 55 U.Prrr. L. REV. 29 1 ,  349 
(1994)) ("Several treatises on fiduciary law name the physician-patient relationship as a fiduciary 
one and the courts have tended to concur."); see also Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. , 793 P.2d 
479, 479 (Cat. 1990). 
1 24. ERISA' s allowance for divided loyalties was predicated upon the realization that to have 
24 FLORIDA LJl W REVIEW (Vol. 53 
The extent of scrutiny an ERIS A fiduciary is to receive during a review of 
the fiduciary' s conduct was to be determined by the degree to which the 
fiduciary's decision was made in the absence of divided loyalty. When a 
fiduciary decision was made in the presence of undivided loyalty to the 
plan, Congress determined the fiduciary should be reviewed under the 
prudent person standard. 125 In essence, ERIS A's prudent person standard 
for breach of fi duciary duty is simply a restatement of the standard of 
review for a common law breach of fiduciary duty. 126 However, when an 
BRISA "fiduciary has dual loyalties, his independent investigation into the 
basis for an investment decision which presents a potential conflict of 
interests must be both intensive and scrupulous and must be discharged 
with the greatest degree of care that could be expected under all the 
circumstances by reasonable beneficiaries and participants of the plan."127 
The greatest degree of care possible means that "even a good faith belief, 
held by the trustees does not insulate them from charges that they have 
acted imprudently."128 Conversely, a fortuitous discretionary decision by 
an ERISA fiduciary that yields a solution in the best interest of the plan is 
not a substitute for a detailed investigation of the highest possible care by 
the BRISA fiduciary.129 "Employers, for example, can be ERISA 
fiduciaries and still take actions to the disadvantage of employee 
beneficiaries, when they act as employers (e.g., firing a beneficiary for 
reasons unrelated to the ERISA plan), or even as plan sponsors (e.g., 
modifying the terms of a plan as allowed by BRISA to provide less 
generous benefits)."130 
In contrast to ERISA' s pragmatic view, at common law, dual loyalties 
are an anathema to the exercise of fiduciary duty. "Professor Scott's 
treatise admonishes that the trustee 'is not permitted to place himself in a 
position where it  would be for his own benefit to violate his duty to the 
b�ne?ciaries. "'1�1 "P�ohibition of dual loyalties in its purest form 
elurunates conflict of mterest, and hence [is] one protective mechanism 
sufficient business expertise to administrate the complicated employee pension plans, the services 
of the beneficiaries' employers would have to be enlisted. 29 U.S.C. § l l 08(c)(3) (2000). 
1 25. 29 �.s.c._ § 1 1 04(a)(l )(A) ( 1 999) ("{f]iduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to 
a pl� sole!� 1� the mterest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive purpose 
of: (t) prov1dmg
. �nefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of admtmstering the plan"). 
126. This is consistent with ERISA's incorporation of the Common Law of Trusts. See 29 U.S.C. § 1 104 note (2000). 
� ;�: 
��novan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 470 (E.D.N.Y. 198 1 ). 
1 29. 
l 30. 
1 3 1 .  
(1987)). 
Id. at 47 1 .  
Pegram v. Herdrich, 1 20 S. Ct. 2 1 43 2 1 5 2  (2000) Id ( . · 
' . 
. Citing AUSTIN w. Scon & WlllJAM F. PRATCHER, LAW OF TRUSTS 3 1 1 ,  § 1 70 
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against abuse of fiduciary power. "132 As such, BRISA' s allowance for dual 
loyalties in its fiduciaries therefore threatens "one of the Act' s declared 
purposes to protect employees' interests in benefit plans."133 
Pegram recognized that financial incentives, which by_ their nature have 
the potential to divide the loyalty of physicians, would lead to problematic 
legal analysis because of this dichotomy in the way in which BRISA 
statutorily allowed for dual loyalty and the common laws abhorrence of the 
same. 134 The Court pointed out that in 
every case charging breach of ERIS A fiduciary duty, then, the 
threshold question is not whether the actions of some person 
providing services under the plan adversely affected a plan 
beneficiary' s  interest, but whether that person was actin§: as 
a fiduciary when taking the action subject to complaint. 1 5 
Realizing that the instant case under review had multiple fiduciaries (the 
HMO and its physician agents are BRISA statutory fiduciaries to the extent 
that they make discretionary decisions over medical services, and 
physicians are independently ERISA fiduciaries due to BRISA 
incorporation of the common law of trusts) to answer this question, the 
Court had to first parse out to which fiduciary the complaint was 
addressed. 
The Court concluded that the complaint did not address the medical 
decisionmaking by the treating physicians. "Herdrich does not point to a 
particular act by any Carle physician owner as a breach."136 Moreover, "at 
oral argument her counsel confirmed that the BRISA count could have 
been brought, and would have been no different, if Herdrich had never had 
a sick day in her life."137 Rather, the complaint was directed solely at the 
HMO for breach of "its duty to act solely in the interest of beneficiaries by 
making decisions affecting medical treatment"138 while simultaneously 
maximizing their own profits by inducing the physicians providers to make 
medical "choices to minimize the medical services . provided."139 
Thereafter, Justice Souter' s discussion only contemplates the HMO's 
liability under ERISA for breach of statutory fiduciary duty. The court's 
silence on physician' s common law obligations to their patients leaves 
132. Frankel, supra note 106, at 8 1 1 .  
133. Schoenholtzv. Doniger, 657F. Supp. 899, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing 29U.S.C. § lOOl(b) 
(1982)). 
134. Pegram, 1 20 S. Ct. at 21 50. 
1 35. Id. at 2146. 
1 36. Id. at 2 1 53 . 
137. Id. 
1 38. Id. 
139. Id. 
26 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW 
(Vol. 53 
open the possibility that fiduciary common law could be used as 
mechanism to regulate both physicians and HMOs.140 
• 
In regards to the HMO's liability for breach of fiduciary duty under 
BRISA, a two-prong analysis is required: first, was the HMO ' s  i�centive 
plan part of the BRISA plan (thereby triggering BRISA preemption) and 
second, was sufficient discretionary authority wielded by the HMO to 
make it a fiduciary under BRISA? The Court answered the first prong 
unequivocally, "No." "The HMO is not the BRISA plan."141 Under 
Pegram, HM Os are merely contractors who implement the employer' s  
benefits plan Then, because the HMO was not an BRISA plan, the 
administration of the plan was not related to the plan itself and cannot 
trigger BRISA preemption of state tort or fiduciary law. 
To determine whether fiduciary obligations to the patient-beneficiary 
were breached requires a more d etailed analysis, because there are 
potentially multiple fiduciaries (due to exercise of discretionary authorit) 
over plan assets): the employer, the HMO, and the physicians who actual I) 
provide the plan benefits. 142 First, the Court contemplated whether the 
employer, as a fiduciary, breached its duty to the plan by contracting witt 
the particular HMO. Pegram again concluded that the answer was "no.'· 
An "employer' s  decisions about the content of a plan are not themselve� 
fiduciary acts."143 Similarly, the incorporators of the HMO did not violate 
the employer's BRISA plan by setting u p  a financial incentive to control 
their physician's  behavior. 144 In other words, what the Court i s  saying i� 
that neither the structure of the employer' s  benefit plan nor the structure 
or internal operations of the HMO, acting alone or in concert w ith eacf. 
other, can result in breach of statutory fiduciary under ERISA. 
Next, Pegram addressed the potential for breach of fiduciary duty b) 
the HMO. The court divided the HMO's responsibilities in regards to 
patient care into "eligibility decisions," "treatment decisions" and "mixed 
140. See infra Parts Ill & IV (discussing this potential). 
141 . Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2 1 53. 
142. In analyzing BRISA fiduciary duty, the Court clearly contemplated the actions of the 
HM
?. The actions of the physicians are mentioned only collaterally, because the physicians in this particular case were owners. of the HMO. However, the statutory fiduciary rules applied by the court to the HMO should be applicable to all non-owner physicians practicing in the HMO environment. because under ERISA, both the HMO and the physicians are conceptually fiduciaries due to their delegated discretionary auth?rity to 
_
m
3;1<� decisions regarding plan assets. See id. A "physician employee would also be subject to hab1hty as a fiduciary on the same basic analysis that would charge the HMO." Id. at 2 1 58. The physician would be a statutory fiduciary to the extent that the HMO is a statutory fiduciary. 
143. Id: at 2 1 53 (citing Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 5 1 7  U.S. 882, 887 ( 1 996) ("Nothing in ERISA requires employers to establish employee benefit plans. Nor does ERIS A mandate what kind of benefit employers must provide if they choose to have such a plan.")). 144. Id. at 2 1 48. 
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eligibility treatment decisions."145 Pure eligibility decisions are those 
decisions which concern the particular condition or medical procedure for 
a treatment covered by the plan. 146 Pure eligibility decisions are clearly 
covered by BRISA because they are related to the plan. In contrast, 
"treatment decisions" are "choices about how to go about diagnosing and 
treating a patent' s  condition: given a patient' s constellation of symptoms, 
what is the appropriate medical response."147 What the court termed 
treatment decisions are in reality medical decisions, which clearly would 
not trigger ERISA protection because they are too tenuously related to the 
plan. 
In contrast, mixed eligibility treatment decisions are those decisions 
predicated on 
physicians' conclusions about when to use diagnostic tests; 
about seeking consultations and making referrals to 
physicians and facilities other than Carie's; about proper 
standards of care, the experimental character of a proposed 
course of treatment, the reasonableness of a certain treatment, 
and the emergency character of a medical condition. 148 
In essence, mixed eligibility treatment decisions are a hybrid of the 
eligibility and treatment decisions. In the business of health care delivery 
such decisions are termed ''denial of care" decisions. Virtually all 
�ecisionmaking in delivering health care in a HMO environment-whether 
tt be a medical director's decision that a condition is not covered, or a 
decision of a treating physician not to treat or refer a medical condition, 
would be classified as mixed eligibility treatment decisions by the Pegram 
Court. To determine if mixed decisions are related to the ERIS A plan, the 
Court needed to locate mixed decisions on the spectrum of eligibility­
treatment decisions. Notice was taken that "the common law trustee' s  most 
defining concern historically has been the payment of money in the i�terest 
of the beneficiary."149 Further, "when Congress took up the subject of 
fiduciary responsibility under BRISA, it concentrated on fiduci�ies' 
financial decisions, focusing on pension plans, the difficulty many retire.es 
faced in getting the payments they expected, and the financial 
mismanaftement that had too often deprived employees of their benefits." so Accordingly, the Pegram Court opined, "Congress did not 
I 45. Although the Pegram Court used different language than the appellate courts, the concept 
is the same: in ERISA health care cases one must distinguish the utilization review decisions, which 
are related to the plan, from the medical decisions, which are not related to the ERISA plan. 
146. Id. at 2 1 54. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 2155. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 2156 (citing s. REP. No. 93- 1 27' at 5 (1 973); S. REP. No. 93-383, at 17 (1973)). 
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intend Carle or any other HMO to be treated as a fiduciary to the extent 
that it makes mixed eligibility decisions acting through its p��sicians."151 
However, the far-reaching implications o� the �egram d
.
ec1s1011: c� �est 
be elucidated by looking at the converse situation. If nuxed ehg1b1hty­
treatment HMO administrative decisions are not covered under ERISA, 
then which HMO administrative decisions are covered? B ased on the 
Court's discussion only pure eligibility decisions are related to the plan 
and hence covered under BRISA. Importantly, because pure eligibility 
decisions are the only HMO administrative decision covered by ERISA, 
such decisions are the only ones that are entitled to E�ISA p�e�mpt�on 
protection. After Pegram, if an HMO engages m adnumstrat1ve 
malfeasance, the BRISA preemption shield will only be availabl� for those 
pure eligibility decisions. When a patient is harmed by a demal of care 
decision, because such decisions are no longer covered by ERISA, the 
HMO will not be able to remove the case to federal court based on a 
question of federal law. In essence, while it is true that BRISA preemption 
protection is available to the HMO for pure eligibility decisions, Pegram 
has so narrowed the BRISA's preemption in the delivery of health care as 
to make it an inconsequential form of protection.152 
Pegram thus ratifies the current majority view of the appellate courts 
that BRISA' s preemption shield is not available for administrative 
malfeasance in the delivery of health care. 153 DeLucia v. St. Lukes ' s 
Hospital154 found that ERISA did not prevent a state court from deciding 
the liability of a insurer for allegedl?" providing suboptimal health care. 
Crum v. Health Alliance-Midwest15 held that because the issue under 
review was the quality of health care, rather than erroneous denial of 
benefits, BRISA preemption was not triggered. The different roles of an 
1 5 1 .  Id. at 2155.  
1 52. The courts may reach a different conclusion fo r  a self-insured plan where the employer 
controls the HMO. Under such a fact pattern, the u ltimate discretionary authority for a denial-of­
care decision would lie with the employer and not with the plan. Because a business organization 
cannot practice medicine, the employer's decision wou Id lack a "treatment" component. Hence, the 
employer's decision would be more of a pure eligibility decision (or alternatively a decision which 
wrongfully denied benefits). Herdrich v. Pegram, 1 54 F.3d 362, 370 (7th Cir. 1 988) (citing Harris 
Trust
.
& Sav. Bank v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 57 F.3d 608, 6 1 3  (7th Cir. 1 995)). In 
Hams �rus_t. Campbell So�p C�. bought out a corporation, terminated some of the purchased 
corporation s employee medical insurance coverage and installed Provident Insurance as the Third 
Party lns�rer to watch over the plan's interests. In a subsequent suit for breach of fiduciary duty, after fin�ing that Camp�ll was a� ERIS� fiduciary, the court "emphasized that it was Campbell, not Provide�t, who re�med th� nght to direct and control the claims procedures and practices, as well as the nght to decide all disputed and non-routine claims." Id. 
1 53. The minority opinion is exemplified by Pryzbowski v. US Healthcare Inc 64 F Su 2d 361 ,  369 (D.N.J. 1999), a case alleging injury due to the failure of the trea�ing �hysi�ian�
�� adv�ate f�r �ut-�f-network surgery. The Pryzbowski court characterized this as a challenge to the plan s ad1n1rustranon and not the delivery of health care. 
1 54. No. Civ. A. 98-6446, 1999 WL 38721 1 ,  •4 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 1999) 1 55. 47 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (CD Ill. 1999). 
. 
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HMO in health care delivery were distinguished in Baumen v. US 
Healthcare, Inc. 156 While tal<lng notice that the HMO was an BRISA 
administrator, Baumen found that quality (or alleged lack thereof) of health 
care provided by an HMO was a matter that was not preempted by ERISA. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Pappas v. Asbel151 that state 
negligence laws had "only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral connection" to 
ERISA plans and hence were not within the scope of BRISA 
preemption. 158 In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Doe, 159 the Missouri district 
court found that a variety of tort claims, including intentional infliction of 
mental distress, were not preempted by BRISA. In fact, in the wake of 
Pegram, there is evidence that the appellate courts are even more skeptical 
of ERISA preemption: 
Although state efforts to regulate an entity in its capacity as 
plan administrator are preempted, managed care providers 
operate in a traditional sphere of state regulation when they 
wear their hats as medical care providers. BRISA preempts 
malpractice suits against doctors making coverage decisions 
in the administration of a plan, but it does not insulate 
physicians from accountability to their state licensing agency 
or a8sociation charged to enforce professional standards 
regarding medical decisions. S uch accountability is necessary 
to ensure that plans operate within the broad compass of 
sound medicine. We are not persuaded that Congress intended 
for BRISA to supplant this state regulation of the quality of 
medical practice. While it may impose some indirect costs on 
ERISA plans, the Court has considered such effects too 
tenuous to require preemption. 160 
Pegram is unwilling to allow plaintiffs to sue for these mixed decisions 
under BRISA, and hence extend the BRISA preemption shield to 
administrative malfeasance in denial of care decisions, because the court 
believes that this just duplicates remedies already available in state courts: 
�hat would be the value to the plan participant of having this 
kind of BRISA fiduciary action? It would simply apply the 
la� already available in state courts and federal diversity 
actions today, and the formulaic addition of an allegation of 
1 56. 1 93 F.3d 1 5 1 ,  1 62-63 (3rd. Ck. 1999). 
1 57. 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998), vacated U.S. Healthcare Sys. v. Penn. Hosp. Ins. Co., 1 20 S .  
Ct. 2686, 2686 (2000) ("Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, Eastern District, for further consideration in light (of Pegram] . . . .  ") . 
1 58. Id. at 892. 
· 1 59. 46 F. Supp. 2d 925 (E.D. Mo. 1999). 
1 60 .  Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dept. of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 534-35 (5th Cir. Tex. 
2000) (citations omitted). 
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financial incentive would do nothing but bring the same claim 
into a federal court under federal-question jurisdiction. It is 
true that in States that do not allow malpractice actions 
against HMOs the fiduciary claim would offer a plaintiff a 
further defendant to be sued for direct liability, and in some 
cases the HMO might have a deeper pocket than the 
physician. But we have seen enough to know that ERIS A was 
not enacted out of concern that physicians were too poor to be 
sued or in order to federalize malpractice litigation in the ' 161 name of fiduciary duty for any other reason. 
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The most interesting comment is the reference to "[s]tates that do not 
allow malpractice actions against HMOs."162 If allowing the plaintiff to sue 
under BRISA for these decisions only duplicates state law in states that do 
not bar litigation against HMOs, then the Court is saying that there is  no 
ERIS A bar to these claims in state court, under state law, including state 
fiduciary law. Thus, this decision calls into question whether there is any 
BRISA protection left for HMOs and their physicians, especially their 
administrative physicians and medical directors, except for the pure 
eligibility decisions, which are almost never at issue in plaintiff 
malpractice actions. Furthennore, the Court' s discussion of breach of 
fiduciary duty concerned only breach of fiduciary duty under BRISA, not 
state common law. Nothing in ERIS A would prevent a physician from 
being sued in state court for breach of fiduciary duty.163 The problem for 
the HMO industry is that once the physician is  found liable for either 
medical malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty under state law, the HM 0 
can be found vicariously liable for the physician' s conduct if it employed 
the physicians or represents to the public that the physicians are the 
HMO's agent. 164 
Pegram thus appears to be a Pyrrhic victory for the HMO industry. In 
finding that mixed decisions of treatment and eligibility, the essence of a 
denial of care decisions, are not related to the ERISA plans, the shield of 
BRISA preemption is no longer available to HMOs that are involved in 
medical care decisionmaking. This emphasizes the key finding of the case: 
that the ERISA plan is the employer's designation of preferred benefits, 
not the medical administrative structure used to deliver the proffered 
benefits. This decision has no affect on the employer's benefits decisions.  
HM Os that choose to manage medical decisionmaking, directly or through 
1 6 1 .  Pegram v. Herdrich, 1 20 S. Ct. 2143, 2158 (2000).  
1 62. Id. 
1 63.  See, e.g., Maxxam v. Hurwitz, 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5274, 10 (N.D. Cal. 1 992) (preempting only claims within scope of 502(a)). But cf Weems v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co. , 663 So. 2d 905 (Ala. 1995) (denying state law claims based on preemption). 
1 64. Petrovich, v. Share Health Plan, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756, 775 (Ill. 1999). 
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branded medical groups, will have to deal with fifty different state laws 
concerning medical malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. 165 This will 
increase administration costs for these HM Os due to the need to absorb the 
increased liability. 166 As HMO administration costs rise, the ERIS A HMOs 
will loose their competitive advantage over non-ERISA HM Os. 167 In short, 
we cannot understand why the stock market reacted favorably to the 
ERISA HMO stock after the announcement of Pegram. 
Pegram took notice that the judicial system was not the best form for 
the analysis of HMO decisionmaking. Such decisions concern the rationing 
of medical care, which is difficult at best. 168 The Court realized that while 
the rationing might have been done poorly in the case under review, 169 it 
was fundamental to managed care.170 Thus, the Court concluded that since 
the legislature had endorsed such rationing, it was not for the courts to 
decide which form of rationing better suited the legislature's public policy 
goals.171 The Court was well aware of Congress' active involvement in 
HMO regulation. 172 Moreover, for the Court to impose statutory fiduciary 
165. Brent D. Hitson, Alabama's Lonely Battle: An Attempt to Exert State Juristiion and 
Award Punitive Damages for Excusively Federal ER/SA Claims in Weems v. Jefferson-Pilot Life 
Insurance Co, Inc., 26 CUMB. L. REV. 591 ,  63 1 (1996). 
Id. 
166. ERISA authorizes the purchase of insurance. 
167. Richards & McLean, supra note 16, at 452. 
168. Pegram, 1 20 S. Ct. at 21 50. 
Since inducement to ration care goes to the very point of any HMO scheme, and 
rationing necessarily raises some risks while reducing others (ruptured appendixes 
are more likely; unnecessary appendectomies are less so}, any legal principle 
purporting to draw a line between good and bad HMOs would embody, in effect, 
a judgment about socially acceptable medical risks. 
169. Id. (citing Kevin Grumbach, et al. Primary Care Physicians ' Experience of Financial 
Incentives in Managed-Care Systems, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 5 1 6  (1998) ("arguing that HMOs 
that reward quality of care and patient satisfaction would be preferable to HM Os that reward only 
physician productivity")). 
170. Id. 
1 7 1 .  Id. "But such complicated factfinding and such a debatable social judgment are not wisely 
required of courts unless for some reason resort cannot be had to the legislative process, with its 
preferable forum for comprehensive investigations and judgments of social value, such as optimum 
treatment levels and health care expenditure." Id. "Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary 
to 'amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data' bearing upon an issue as complex and dynamic 
as that presented here."' Id. (quoting Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305
, 
331 n. 12 ( 1995)). 
1 72. Id. at 2 1 56-57 ("The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1 973, 87 Stat. 9 1 4, 42 U.S.C. § 300e et seq., allowed the formation of HM Os that assume financial risks for the provision 
of health care services, and Congress has amended the Act several times, most recently in 1 996. See 
1 10 Stat. 1976, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300e ( 1 994 ed. Supp. III). If Congress wishes to restrict its 
approval of HMO practice to certain preferred forms, it may choose to do so."). 
32 FWRIDA LAW REVIEW 
[Vol. 53 
duty on the HMO in the present case would � c?�nt�;4 
to public policy, 173 
because it would increase HMO exposure to hab1hty. Thus the Supreme 
Court signaled that it no longer wanted to retrospectively review medical 
decisions based on BRISA statutory fiduciary guidelines. However, courts 
of law will always be the proper forums to hear actions based on fiduciary 
common law. 
m. REGULATION OF HMOs UNDER STATE FIDUCIARY COMMON LA w 
Pegram destroyed the protection from state law that HMOs received 
under BRISA for administrative malfeasance in medical decisionmaking. 
"[W]e held that, in the field of health care, a subject of traditional state 
regulation, there is no BRISA preemption without clear manifestation of 
congressional purpose."175 Pegram had no desire to federalize medical 
malpractice. 176 Hence, Pegram clearly contemplated that state medical 
malpractice law would be used to regulate HMO health care delivery. 
However, the practice of medicine in an HMO environment i s  unl ike the 
practice of medicine in the fee-for-service [FFS] environment that honed 
and polished the tort of medical malpractice. Financial incentives under 
FFS directed physicians to provide too many medical services and errors 
in health care delivery were assumed to be anomalous situations. Under 
FFS, the frauds that occurred involved the taxpayer and the insurer. 177 In 
contrast, financial incentives in HMO health care delivery direct the 
physician to under-treat patients . 178 Fraud which equates to wrongfu l denial 
of care for pecuniary gain, results in a fraud that "is more likely to make 
173. The Balanced Budget Act of 1 997 specifically authorized the use of HMO structure for 
the delivery of health care under Medicare. Pub. L. No. 1 05. 33 § 407 (a). 
174. Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2 1 57. 
Id. 
It wo�ld be so easy to allege: and to find, an economic influence when sparing 
care did not lead to a well patient, that any such standard in practice would allow 
a factfinder to conv�rt an HM� into a guarantor of recovery . . .  [f]or all practical 
pu��ses, every cl:Um of fiduciary breach by an HMO physician making a mixed 
dec1s10� would bod down to a malpractice claim, and the fiduciary standard would 
be n�t�mg but the malpractice standard traditionally applied in actions against 
phys1c1ans. 
1 75. Id. at 2158 (citing N.Y. St. Conf. ofBlue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins Co 514 U.S. 645, 654-55 ( 1 995)). 
. . ,  
1 76. Id. 
D 
177: J�hn T. Bo�se, When Angry Patients become Angry Prosecutors: Medical Necessity eterminati
.
ons, Quality of Care and the Qui Tam Law, 43 ST. LoUJs u. L.J. 53 ,  5 8  ( 1 999) 1 78. Richards & McLean, supra note 1 6, at 449. 
· 
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the patient the primary victim. "179 HMO health care delivery has fueled the 
media battle over the incidence of errors in the delivery of health care. 180 
HMO health care delivery creates unique mechanisms by which 
patients are harmed. The concept of injuring a patient by limiting the care 
options to the patient did not arise under FFS health care delivery, so the 
traditional tort mechanism for redressing medical injuries has not yet 
evolved to deal with the new mechanisms of injury ushered in by HMO 
health care delivery. True, given enough time, medical malpractice law 
could be modified to cope with denial of care issues. But, stretching a body 
of law predicated upon misguided or misapplied acts is not necessarily the 
best application of modem jurisprudence. This is especially true where 
there already exists a well-formed body of fiduciary common law that is 
ideally suited to deal with medical errors arising from conflicts of 
interest. 181 While breach of statutory fiduciary action under BRISA may no 
longer be used to redress patient harm, nothing in Pegram prohibits an 
action against a physician for breach of common law fiduciary duty. 
While most jurisdictions have found physicians to be fiduciaries, 182 
none has appreciated that a physician may simultaneously be a fiduciary 
in more than one capacity. A physician' s fiduciary duty applies whether the 
physician acts in the capacity of a treating physician or as an administrator 
(medical director), or both. Both types of physicians have intrinsic 
conflicts of interests, which could serve as the foundations for a breach of 
fiduciary duty action. Both types of physicians are omnipresent in HMO 
health care delivery. But the loyalties and obligation associated with the 
fiduciary relationships of the treating physicians and the medical directors 
are not identical. Despite wearing the cap of a corporate administrator, the 
medical director is nonetheless engaged in the practice of medicine 
whenever the medical director' s  decisions are based on information about, 
and affect the care of, a specifically identified patient. 183 Because the 
179. Boese, supra note 1 77,  at 58. 
1 80. See, e.g . .  To ERR Is HUMAN: BUilDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn 
et al. eds., 1 999) (The well-publicized "IOM report" concludes that as many as 98,000 Americans 
die each year due to errors which occur in the health care delivery system.); Clement J. McDonald 
et al., Deaths Due to Medical E"ors Are Exaggerated in the Institute of Medicine Report, 284 
JAMA 93-94 (2000) (disputing the validity of the methodology employed by the IOM). But see 
Lucian L. Leape, Institute of Medicine Medical Error Figures Are Not Exaggerated, 284 JAMA 
95-97 (2000) (rebuttal to McDonald). 
1 8 1 .  Medical malpractice arises when a physician negligently provides an independent medical 
judgment. But the clinical material that underpins such a judgment must be gained from being at 
the patient' s bedside. Thus, the majority of such medical malpractice cases are ultimately incidental 
to a physical examination being performed. Hence, the physician or the physician• s agent must at 
some point be at the patient' s bedside. In contrast, breach of fiduciary law, the subornation of the 
patient' s  interest to the physician's interest, can occur anywhere. 
182. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,  793 P.2d 479, 488 (Cal. 1990). 
183 · This mirrors the distinction the United States Supreme Court drew between decisions that 
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medical director does not routinely examine patients-rather medical 
directors only examine a patient's medical record-it can be difficult to 
hold a medical director liable for medical malpractice.
184 However, such 
medical administrative malfeasance can be easily handled under fiduciary 
common law. 
A. Medical Practice and the Obligations of the Treating Physician 
Ordinarily, the delivery of medical care is by a treating physician who 
will provide patient care either in a direct or indirect fashion. Direct patient 
care is care provided by a treating physician in a "face to face" fashion. 
Gynecologists, internists. surgeons and the like provide direct, hands-on 
patient care. In contrast, indirect patient care occurs when a treating 
physician acts in a consultant capacity. In this regard radiologists, 
pathologists, and anesthesiologists (collectively the "hospital-based 
physicians") all provide medical expertise required for specialized medical 
decisionmaking. Although patients rarely know the names of the hospital­
based physicians who participate in their care, patients are generally aware 
of the existence of hospital-based physicians, and that these physicians also 
provide care through specialized medical care services. After reviewing the 
raw data185 obtained from the patient, the hospital-based physicians 
memorialize their medical decision in consultative reports found within the 
body of the patient' s  medical record, and in bills for services, just as the 
direct patient care providers do. Because the consultant physicians have 
rendered a medical judgment that affects the care of the patient, they have 
been subjected to traditional malpractice liability for their negligent 
decisionmaking. 186 
Treating physicians are the archetypal "doctors" who enter into what 
the law terms the "doctor-patient" or "physician-patient" relationship. 187 
Traditionally, treating physicians have been proud of their individual 
autonomy, and have seen themselves as being the patient's advocate. The 
involve individuals and those that involve populations. See Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 
2 1 0  U.S. 373 (1908); see also Bi-Metallic lnv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 444-
45 ( 1915). 
• 
1 84. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 5 1 6 U.S. 489, 514 (1 996). 
1 85. Raw data as used herein contemplates the actual examination of a radiographic or 
pathologic examination. 
1 86. See, e.g., Jen?ff v. Gleason, 52� A.2d 1323, 1329 (1987) (holding that indirect providers 
have a duty to communicate unusual findings, as the communication is as important as the findings 
themselves); Grana�o v. �adsen
.
' 7�9 S.W.2'.1 866, 874 (Tex. 1 987) (holding that indirect providers 
have a duty to prov1d� patient �th mf�nnatton necessary for informed consent); Hiers v. Lemley, 
1 ?9 1 �o. App. Lexis I 500, 5 (finding pathologists are the ultimate arbitrators of a clinical 
d1agnos1s). 
1. 87 · �0.r all the physicians (direct and indirect patient care providers), the doctor-patient 
relat10nsh1p 1s created when the doctor renders an independent medical judgment (i.e., a decision). 
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doctor's superior knowledge, as compared to the patient, leads naturally to 
paternal ideation, while the financial incentives under the FPS 
reimbursement system encouraged the physician to do everything possible 
for the patient. When a treating physician exercises such non-reciprocal 
power by rendering a medical judgment that affects a patient' s  health care, 
the physician becomes a fiduciary to the patient. 188 
The medical decision itself is the end result of a reiterative five-step 
intellectual process. The steps are: 
( 1 )  evaluation of patient' s  complaints and history, 
(2) gathering physical and laboratory information, 
(3) making a medical decision, 
( 4) re-evaluation of the outcomes of those decisions, and 
(5) the collection of new information about the patient's 
altered condition. 
A treating physician gathers information by taking a history from a 
patient, the p atient's family, or speaking with a fellow health care provider 
(Step 1). Alternatively, infonnation can be extracted from the patient's 
medical record. This oral and written information is supplemented through 
the "laying of hands" on a patient (that is, physical examination) and 
through obtaining confirmatory laboratory studies (Step 2). Medical 
decisionmaking results from the physician's mental thought process as the 
first two steps are reviewed under the aegis of the physician 's training and 
experience (Step 3). Such decisions are two-fold, encompassing a 
diagnosis and a treatment recommendation. While diagnosis is often seen 
as the key operational decision by physicians, from the patient's  
perspective, the treatment recommendation, or lack of one, is  more 
critical. 1 89 It is the remaking of these medical decisions that is the practice 
of medicine. Step 4, the evaluation of the outcome of the medical 
intervention, is the most critical because it closes the loop. If the outcome 
of treatment is not effective (that is, the patient does not improve), the 
medical decision must be re-evaluated. If the treatment is effective, the 
patient must be monitored to assure that the condition stays controlled. 190 
1 88. Frankel, supra note 106, at 800. 
1 89. Society clearly views the making of a medical decision to be the dominant step in the 
practice of medicine. Gathering and affirming of medical information has for sometime been an 
activity which could be delegated to a physician assistant or a nurse. The privilege of making a 
medical decision, however, remains an activity reserved to physicians in most states. 
190. When a medical decision is totally inappropriate due to the failure to properly complete 
the first two steps (gathering and affirming of medical information) the result is gross negligence. 
In contrast, "garden variety" medical malpractice results from failure to adequately reassess the 
impact of a medical decision and correct those decisions which yield an aberrant and adverse 
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Step 5 begins the process again. Outcome evaluation !11ay be based on 
follow-up lab tests, patient reports, and subs�que.nt physical exams. These last two steps are most likely to be compronused m managed car�, because 
they require the evaluation of what should be a .. well" patient. 19� In 
Herdrich, Shea, Lancaster, andNeade, a subseque�t checkup of th� pat�ent 
would have shown that the initial diagnosis was incorrect, allowmg time 
for proper diagnosis and treatment. . As a fiduciary, the common law imposes all of the general fiduciary 
obligations upon the treating physician, which include: 
'al . fi . 192 ( 1 )  The requirement to disclose maten m ormat1on. 
(2) The use of good faith and fair dealings with patients. 1 93 
(3) Maintenance of confidentiality._194 • • 195 (4) Formal notice for the termination of the relationship, 
and 
outcome. 
1 9 1 .  A major premise in the cost cutting rational of managed care is that after the first three 
steps in the practice of medicine, subsequent review i s  unnecessary as the patient i s  presumed 
"well." Managed care operates on the assumption that the initial medical decision was presumably 
a correct decision. If it is incorrect. it is often the patient who must convince the physician, 
sometimes in the face of fatal opposition, as in Shea and Lancaster. 
192. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1 997); see also Garcia v .  Coffman, 946 
P.2d 2 16, 222 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Kem ex rel. Kem v. St. Joseph Hosp . , Inc . •  697 P.2d 
135, 1 39 (N.M. 1 985) ("physician's affinnative duty to disclose material infonnation continues 
beyond tennination of the fiduciary relationship")); Hunter v. Brown, 484 P.2d 1 162, 1 166 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1971) ("Whether the failure to disclose was willful or attributable to negligence is 
immaterial."); Hunter 484 P.2d al 1 167 (citing Michael J. Myers, Comment, Informed ConsenJ in 
Medical Malpractice, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1396, 1407 (1967)) ("[a] physician is under an obligation to 
(1) make a full disclosure of all known material risks in a proposed operation or course of treatment 
except for those risks of which the patient is likely to know or (2) to prove the reasonableness of any 
lesser disclosure or the immateriality of the undisclosed risk."). 
193. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 5 1 6  U.S. 489, 506 ( 1996) (citation omitted); see also Hunter, 484 
P.2d at 1 1 66 ("At the same time, the physician must place the welfare of his patient above all else 
and this very fact places him in a position in which he sometimes must choose between two 
alternative courses of action."); Moore v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo. 1 96 1 )  ('The physician 
has a duty to act with the utmost good faith."). 
194. Brandt v. Medical Defense Assoc., 857 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. App 1 992) (holding that the 
fiduciary duty or confidential relationship between physician and patient implicates a duty to disclose all material information concerning the patient's treatment); see also Garcia, 946 P.2d at 
222 (citing Keithley v. St. Joseph's Hosp. , 698 P.2d 435, 439 (N.M. Ct. App. 1 984)) ("[F]iduciary 
duty or confidential relationship between physician and patient implicates a duty to disclose all 
material information concerning the patient's treatment."); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1 990): Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 1 1 3 ,  1 1 3 (Mass.), cert denied, 474 U.S.  546 (1985); Home v. Patten, 287 So. 2d 824, 828 ( 1 973); Hammonds v .  Aetna Cas. & Sur., 237 F. Supp 96 (N.D. Oh. 1965). 
195.  Hammonds, 237 F. Supp at 99. 
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(5) Undivided loyalty.196 
Breach of any of the general fiduciary duties by a physician was 
actionable at common law. The two most important of the general 
fiduciary duties for the physician are a duty of "loyalty" and "good faith 
and fair dealing." Shea observed that the "duty of loyalty requires [a 
physician] fiduciary to communicate any material facts which could 
adversely affect a plan member's interests." 197 Additionally, good faith and 
fair dealing imply that the physician-fiduciary may face a civil action for 
what is known customarily as "dishonesty." Hence, conduct which could 
potentially trigger liability for breach of fiduciary duty includes: "bait and 
switch" (a nominal physician's services are actually provided by another� 
e.g., during surgical residency), 198 where a physician receives a profit in 
any form for the referral of a Jatient for an otherwise needed service (specifically, laboratory work), 1 and other forms of self-referral with built 
in "kickback" mechanisms.200 
Importantly, at common law, the standard for review in determining 
whether a breach has occurred is from the patient's perspective. "When an 
ailing person selects a physician to treat him, he does so with the full 
expectation that such [a] physician will do his best to restore him to 
health . . . .  "201 Along these lines the Shea Court observed: 
Although the district court acknowledged Medica's duty of 
loyalty, the court felt the compensation arrangements between 
Medica and its doctors were not material facts requiring 
disclosure. We disagree. From the patient's point of view, a 
196. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 469 (1981) .  
197. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997). The material fact referred to was the 
insurer's physician incentive plan. 
198. Such conduct may also trigger civil liability for the filing of a false claim under the 
Kennedy-Kasselbaum Bill. Health Ins. Portability and Accountability Act of 1 996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191 ,  1 10 Stat. 1 936 ( 1996); see also Richards & McLean, supra note 16, at 443. 
199. Richards & McLean, supra note 1 6, at 45 1-52. The physician-fiduciary faces more than 
civil action for the unlawful acceptance of money. As the majority of states have adopted the Model 
Penal Code, many states have criminal codes finding the physician to be a fiduciary. Society has 
yet to declare where the line will be drawn with respect to corruption of the physician-fiduciary with 
respect to bribery. In this regard, consider the HMO use of a "withhold." A "withhold" is an 
incentive to keep the physician ever mindful of the cost of medical goods and services. Specifically, 
the withhold is to give the physician an incentive for denial of care. The withhold in monetary terms 
may be as much as 25% of the physicians salary. At what point is the withhold large enough to 
corrupt the physician's judgment sufficient to trigger criminal liability? 
200. D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 17 1  (Minn. Ct. App. I 997) (Referencing kickbacks: 
"Although the putative class attempts to frame the issue before us as one involving a breach of 
fiduciary duty, the gravamen of the complaint sounds in medical malpractice."). 
201 . Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 237 F. Supp 96 (N.D. Oh. 1 965). 
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financial incentive scheme put in place �o influence a �a.ting 
doctor's referral practices when the patient needs spec1al1zed 
care is certainly a material piece of information. �s kind of 
patient necessarily relies on the doctor's advice about 
treatment options. and the patie_nt must �ow w�cther. the 
advice is influenced by self-serving financial cons1derat10ns 
created by the health insurance provider . . . .  m 
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Other courts have affirmed this view: "It is well accepted that patients 
deserve medical opinions about treatment plans and referrals unsullied by 
conflicting motives."203 
However, fact patterns that could form the basis of a medical 
malpractice action could also be used to form the basis of a breach of 
fiduciary duty. The Neade Court concluded that under appropriate 
circumstances an independent breach of fiduciary duty cause of action 
could arise from a common set of facts with a medical malpractice 
claim.204 The benefit of pleading a case as breach of fiduciary duty rather 
than medical malpractice is that breach of fiduciary duty may not be 
subject to medical malpractice caps on recovery.� This potential to avoid 
a medical malpractice cap has not gone unnoticed: "Plaintiffs no doubt 
crafted craft Count V [involving actual and constructive fraud] with an eye 
on avoiding this cap."206 Since much of what constitutes sufficient grounds 
for medical malpractice against a treating physician can be rephrased as a 
breach of fiduciary duty. a fair question is just how does one differentiate 
ordinary or "garden variety" medical negligence from a breach of fiduciary 
obligations?207 
Breach of fiduciary duty and medical malpractice can be differentiated 
by whether the physician has reviewed the raw data [i.e., actually examined 
202. Shea, 107 F.3d at 628. 
203. D.A.B., 510 N.W.2d at 170 (citing Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. 
Ass'n, Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the Amercian M�dical 
Association-1 986, § 8.06, at 31  (1 986) (mandating referrals be made in best interests of patient)); 
see also David Burda, AMA Toughens Guidelines on Physician Self-Referrals. 2 1  MOD. 
HEALTHCARE 4, 4 ( 1991 ). 
204. Neade v. Portes, 7 1 0  N.E.2d 4 1 8, 428 (Ill. Ct. App. 1999). 
205. O� course, there is a downside to pleading a breach of fiduciary duty against a physician. 
Such an action may not be covered by medical malpractice insurance, and at present it would be 
a rare physician who would have appropriate insurance coverage for breach of fiduciary duty. 
Judgin� by �e reluctance of physicians to obtain stop· loss insurance as a contingency to deal with 
the business nsks of managed care medicine, it will be some time before the medical community sees 
the value in insurance for breach of fiduciary duty. 
206. LancasterbyLancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 958 F. Supp. l 1 37, 1 1 50 (E.D. Va. 
1 997). 
. 
2?7 .  Varity Corp. v. Howe, 5 1 6 U.S. 489, 514 (1996) (conunenting on this hypothetical 
situation). 
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the patient] and whether the medical decision was well thought out. 
Medical malpractice ultimately turns on a physician ' s  collection and 
review of the patient' s raw data [Step 2] and the rendering of a medical 
decision [Step 3]. Implicit in Step 2 is that the physician or physician's 
agent must come into physical and temporal proximity to the patient. 
Whether the physician lays his hands on the patient, reviews the patient's  
radiographic images, or examines the patient' s  tissue under a microscope, 
the treating physician's  judgment is predicated on an examination of the 
patient's raw clinical data in a timely manner. The failure to examine the 
patient properly, or worse, ignoring the patient' s  raw data, is what forms 
the bases of a medical malpractice action. Medical malpractice turns on a 
poorly rationalized decision, that is a "sloppy" decision. Hence a mistaken 
diagnosis, incompetent surgery, or error of omission in the face of 
adequate information could be malpractice. 
In contrast, a physician's breach of fiduciary duty to a patient does not 
require a close temporal physical nexus to the patient to occur. In fact, the 
physician's decision to violate a fiduciary obligation may occur long 
before208 or long after209 the formation of the doctor-patient relationship. 
Nor does breach of fiduciary duty require that the treating physician review 
the patient's  raw data. What breach of fiduciary duty does contemplate is 
that an affirmative decision is made to subordinate the patient's best 
interest to those interests of the physician or some third party. 210 Hence a 
choice not to do a necessary test, not to collect adequate information, or 
not to call in a specialty surgeon because of the cost of the tests would 
ultimately reduce the income of a physician or an insurer, would be a 
breach of fiduciary duty. Notice that breach of fiduciary duty occurs 
regardless of how well the science of medicine is rationalized. In fact, a 
well-rationalized scientific decision may give an index to the degree to 
which the physician has reached to subordinate the patient's interest. 
We realize that an "invisible hand"21 1  has always modulated the 
decisions of physicians regardless of the reimbursement mechanisms or the 
presence of ERISA protection. While in the managed care environment 
there are incentives to reduce care,212 it must be remembered that 
208. For example, the physician's conscious decision to receive all of the withhold money 
under a capitated contract could occur before the physician ever meets any HMO patients. 
209. For example, a physician• s decision to breach a patient' s confidentiality may occur long 
after the formal doctor-patient relationship has come to an end. 
210. In the managed care arena, the physician subordinates the patient's interests to the 
interests of the physician (e.g., so that the physician receives the maximum bonus or withhold) and 
the insurance carrier, which attempts to limit expenditures. Richards & McLean, supra note 16, at 
452. 
21 1 .  ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1 776). 
2 1 2. Under managed care, physicians may reduce care either by flat out denial or, as the Shea 
line of cases illustrates, by failure to re-evaluate the patient properly. That is, managed care provides 
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traditional FFS reimbursement provided incentives for excess and hence 
unnecessary care. With FPS medicine the issue of breach of fiduciary duty 
generally did not arise because the ph
.
ysician receive� pecuniary incentives 
to re-evaluate the patients. That is, the FFS reimbursement system 
rewarded physicians for increasing the volume of care given. The financial 
incentives under FPS medicine were such that a physician had no reason 
to subordinate the patient's interests to the insurer's bottom line. Thus in 
the FFS environment, patients were banned when a physician sub}ected the 
patient to unnecessary tests, medical treatments or surgery. 2 1  Medical 
malpractice was honed to deal with harm caused by excessive and 
sometimes unneeded medical care that occurred as a discrete event. In 
contrast, the purpose of managed care is to ration or deny medical care. In 
managed care medicine a patient may be harmed by a denial of care 
decision made by a physician the patient does not even know . Moreover, 
managed care systematically dissuades a treating physician from executing 
Steps 4 and 5 in the reiterate medical practice cycle. These features of 
managed care medicine can frustrate the application of traditional tort law 
because they seek to change the standard of care. Fiduciary law is ideally 
suited to provide remedies where a fiduciary is systematically corrupted 
out of the presence of the beneficiary. 
B. Medical Practice and Obligations of Medical Directors 
A medical director is a physician who acts as an administrator and 
oversees medical care provided by an organization. Conceptually, a 
medical director should exist whenever a business organization provides 
medical services on a contractual basis, as state laws generally limit the 
extent to which corporations may engage in the practice of medicine.214 
Examples of such corporate provided services include: I )  staffing 
emergency rooms or occupational medical care clinics, 2) medical research 
involving human subjects, and 3) the administration of insurance. Many 
large corporations have more than one medical director, with one at the 
corpor�te office and one for each region or plant. These corporate medical 
physi.cians wit� �nancial incentive not to proceed to Step 4 in the decision algorithm for the practice of med1cme. 
. 213.' Elliot S. Fisher & H. Gilbert Welch, Avoiding the Unintended Consequences of Growth 
m Medical Care, 28 1 JAMA 446-453, 449-50 ( 1 999). 
� 1.4. Richards & McLean, supra note 1 6, at 445. The prohibition on corporate practice of m
�icme dates to �he 1 920's. "Interestingly, [restrictions placed on the practice of medicine] evo ved fro� laws intended to prevent the practice of law by corporations. Their purpose was to protect !he i
h
ndepcndence of the professional' s judgment from the pressures triggered by making money aor t e stockholders of a business." Id. 
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director positions existed long before managed care entered the health care 
arena.215 
Medical directors practice medicine. In the spectrum of the practice of 
medicine, the medical director' s form of practice most closely resembles 
the hospital-based physician's practice, as the medical director does not 
provide direct patient care. In contrast to the hospital based treating 
physician, however, the medical director is invisible to the patient, 
providing neither a consultative report nor a bill. In rendering a denial of 
care decision the medical director employs, with minor variation,216 the 
same reiterating five-step intellectual thought process employed by the 
treating physicians. But the medical director will only review the filtered 
reports of the treating physicians and the patient's medical records. In 
actual practice, many of these "denial-of-care" decisions are not made by 
a physician but are delegated to nurses or other physician extenders to be 
made by standard protocols.217 Legally, however, as only physicians may 
make medical decisions in most states, the responsibility for a nurse or 
physician extender' s medical decision flows back to the physician.2 18 
Form, not substance, in the practice of medicine is what differentiates 
the medical director's  practice of medicine from the treating physician's  
practice. Key to understanding liability of HMOs is the fact that their 
medical directors' decisions are medical decisions,219 while the medical 
director' s administrative authority, exercised on behalf of the HMO, makes 
the HMO vicariously liable for the decisions. The medical director directly 
215. This article focuses on the medical director within the insurance industry. 
216. Procedurally, the medical director does not collect and affirm clinical information 
personally, as a treating physician would (i.e., the medical director does not personally execute 
Steps l and 2 above), rather, the medical director generally relics on the information gathered by 
the treating physicians. But after making a medical decision involving patient care (Step 3) the 
medical director collects further information (Step 4) and makes remedial decisions (Step 5). The 
major difference between a treating physician' s  medical practice and medical director's medical 
practice is the latter generally makes a decision about a population of patients rather than individual 
patients. However, whenever the medical director makes an individual patient decision, the medical 
director's practice of medicine is identical to the treating physician's practice. Accordingly, where 
a medical director intervenes in a particular patient's care, the medical director should be as liable 
for treatment decisions as the treating physician. 
21 7. An HMO usually does the initial screening for denial-of-care on the basis of an opinion 
rendered by a masters-level nurse or occasionally by a registered nurse. The nurse generally denies 
care because it is deemed unnecessary and/or not covered by the patient' s policy. Routinely, the 
nurse's decision may be appealed to the medical director whose decision is generally final. See Jass 
v. Prudential Health Care Plan, 88 F.3d 1 482, 1 488-89 (1 996). 
218.  In California, if a physician wishes to supervise a physician assistant, the supervising 
physician is required to have a written "Delegation of Medical Services" document on file. 66 MED. 
Bo. OF CAL. ACTION REP. 4 (July 1 998). 
219. Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 949 P.2d 530, 536 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 997) ('There is no 
other way to characterize Dr. Murphy's decision: it was a 'medical' decision."). 
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influences patient care when a particular pati�n� is de�ied care u�on the 
request. When a medical director makes a dec1s10n which deternun�s (at 
least in part) which providers, what services, and what products �111 be 
potentially available to all patients under the corporate contract �1th the 
employer, the medical director indirectly influences the care o.f patients. In 
some plans, the medical director will even change medications orde�ed 
directly, without operating through or with the knowledge of the treat�ng 
physician. In short, the medical director has authority over both treatmg 
physicians and their patients. 
By exercising control over a patient's medical care, either directly or 
acting through a treating physician, the medical director becomes a 
common law fiduciary, independent of a direct physician-patient 
relationship.220 Unlike a treating physician, who at least when operating in 
the traditional FPS environment did not have to answer to a corporate 
master, the medical director of necessity renders medical decisions under 
a requirement of dual loyalties. The dual loyalties of the medical director 
create a situation that is intrinsically antagonistic to the fiduciary doctor­
patient relationship, which at common law demanded undivided loyalty .221 
Nowhere is the tension between the dual loyalties of the medical director 
clearer than in making the decision to deny medical care. Daily, medical 
directors must make the difficult decision of whether to deny care and 
hence favor the corporate master or provide the patient a treatment with a 
low probability of success at a high cost and hence favor the patient.222 
In practice, what distinguishes the medical director' s decisions from the 
treating physician's  decisions are three factors. First, the medical director's  
prime interests are the administration of a group of patients rather than the 
care provided to an individual patient. Second, the medical director's 
decision is final223 and, consequently, such decisions are more important 
220. There are no rituals or talismanic expressions which create a physician patient 
relationship. Objectively, the creation of the physician-patient relationship occurs when a contract 
has been formed; that is, when the patient asks for assistance and the physician accepts the patient. 
See, e.g., Clanton v. von Haam, 340 S.E.2d 627, 630 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); Davis v. Weiskoff, 439 
N.E.2d 60, 64 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982). But this begs the question how the parties to such a contract 
rec?gnize the process of offer and acceptance. From a practical point of view, the physician and 
patient recognize that a relationship is formed when the physician offers an independent medical 
decision or judgment and the patient relies on the physician' s decision. This reliance is the basis 
for the physician-patient relationship and the accompanying fiduciary obligations. For many cases, 
�he relationship arises from status relationships, such as the physician agreeing to treat all patients 
m a health plan or to treat all patients entering an emergency room. 
221 .  Donovan v. Bierwirth , 538 F. Supp. 463, 469 (E.D. N.Y. 1981). 
222: If.
the treatment under review by a medical director had a high probability of providing 
a cu
.
re (1.e., tt w� well accepted by the medical community as appropriate) then it is assumed that 
the issue of dental-of-care would not arise. 
�2: . For ERIS� self-insured plans, medical care and decisions made by an insurer­
admm1strator can ultimately be appealed directly to the employer. 
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to the patient than the treating physician ' s  decision. And third, the medical 
director only examines a patient's  medical record, never the patient. Unlike 
treating physicians, when a patient is banned by a medical director's 
decisionmaking which results in a wrongful denial of care and the patient 
sustains bodily injury, the patient may not have a "garden variety" medical 
malpractice remedy against the medical director. 
If the patient-plaintiff filed a traditional medical malpractice action 
against a medical director, the plaintiff would face several hurdles. The 
plaintiff would have to demonstrate a doctor-patient relationship. Other 
than the opinion in Murphy v. Board of Medical Examiners ,224 there is not 
clear case law that places a medical director in a doctor-patient 
relationship. Also, a plaintiff suing the medical director would have a 
causation problem. Arguably, the treating physician' s conduct might be 
viewed as an independent act which "cut off' the medical director' s  
liability. In contrast, if the medical director was sued for breach of 
fiduciary duty, all that would have to be shown is that the medical 
director's decision impacted that plaintiff and in forming that decision the 
medical director subordinated the patient' s interest. The latter is simple to 
understand because the medical director, by necessity, operates in a world 
of divided loyalties. After the fact, when a patient has sustained an injury 
because a medical service was denied, it will be very difficult to 
demonstrate that the medical service was unnecessary where it is also 
shown that the medical director was serving more than one master. 
In short, the medical director is  actively engaged in the practice of 
medicine, and, like the treating physician, the medical director may make 
bad decisions based on either incompetence (that is medical malpractice), 
or the medical director may make decisions that subordinate the patient' s 
interests to the plan's interest (i.e., breach of fiduciary duty) . When a 
physician assumes a medical director' s  position, he or she does not cease 
to be a physician. The common law fiduciary duties are no less onerous on 
a physician because the physician functions as a medical director rather 
than a treating physician. The importance of the medical director' s position 
for purposes of HMO litigation lies in  the ubiquitous nature of the position 
itself. The medical director position exists whenever a corporation 
oversees medical services. As such, the medical director position is the 
legal nexus between all HMO plans and their patients and should provide 
a common path for regulation, irrespective of the organizational structures 
of the plan.225 The medical director' s position serves as a portal for 
224. 949 P.2d 503, 536 (Ariz. Ct. App. I 997). 
225. Thomas W. Waldron, Rehrmann Backs Effort on HMO Discipline, BALT. SUN, June I I ,  
1 998, at 6B. ''The General Assembly defeated a bill . . .  to put medical directors of HMOs under 
the same disciplinary scrutiny as doctors." Id. Subsequently, Maryland has placed medical directors 
under the control of the insurance board. See MD. CODE ANN. § I 5- 1Oc-02( 1 )( 1 999). 
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assigning liability to virtually any business organization for breach of 
fiduciary duty based upon administrative malfeasance. 
C. Damages for Breach of Common Law Fiduciary Duty 
Under the common law, remedies for breach of fiduciary duty were 
equitable and "endeavor[ ed] as far as possible to replace the parties in the 
same situation as they would have been in, if no breach of trust had been 
committed."226 Historically, equitable remedies were differentiated from 
legal remedies. ''Money damages are, of course, the classic form of legal 
relief,"227 whereas equitable remedies are classically "injunctions or 
restitution."228 The issue, then, is when a patient sustains injury due to 
medical director' s or treating physician's breach of fiduciary duty, what is 
the appropriate relief for such patients? 
1 . Equitable Relief for Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Equitable relief is "limited to those remedies that were typically 
available in equity, i .e. injunctions, mandamus and restitution."229 
Classically then, equitable remedies were non-pecuniary orders or awards 
which were granted in order to make an aggrieved party "whole." A listing 
of the more common equitable remedies available for breach of fiduciary 
duty include:230 
(1 ) Injunctive and declaratory relief. 
(2) Pre-judgment interest and attachment of assets. 
(3) Forfeiture of beneficial interest by breaching fiduciary. 
(4) Imposition of a constructive trust . 
(5) Compulsion of payment owed. 
(6) Restitution of misappropriated funds . 
226. Menens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 264 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting J .  
Hill, Annotation, Remedy at Law Available to Beneficiary of Trust as Exclusive Remedy in Equity, 
171 A.L.R. 429 (1947)). 
227. Id. at 255 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)); see also Teamsters v. 
Terry, 494 U.S. 588, 570-01 (1990); D. Dobbs, Remedies § 1 . 1  p.3 (1973). 
228. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 225. 
229. 29 U.S.C.S. § l 132note(1997} (citingCunninghamv. Dun&BradstreetPlan Servs., 889 
F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Miss. 1995)). 
230. This compilation was extracted from Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, What constitutes 
"other appropriate equitable relief' under §§ 502(a)(3)(b), 502(a)(5)(8) of the Employee 
Retir�ment Income S�cu�ty Act (29 U.S.C.S. §§ 1 132(aX3)(B), J J32(a)(5)(b)) which may be 
obtained to redress violation or to enforce provisions, of {the] Act, 98 A.L.R. 705 ( 1 997). 
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(7) Removal of fiduciary. 
Implicit in this enumeration of equitable remedies is that to be effective 
in providing relief for breach of fiduciary duty the contents of the trust 
must not only be identifiable, but the contents of the trust also must be 
recoverable or replaceable. That is ,  for equitable relief to make the party 
"whole," the property in question needs to be fungible. Not surprisingly, 
equitable remedies have worked well where a fiduciary has defrauded a 
trust, such as a pension fund or where the trustee has breached the 
confidence of the beneficiary for profit,231 because in both of these 
circumstances the asset in question (money) is both seizable and fungible. 
However, equity cannot, by itself, make whole a party who has sustained 
either bodily injury or wrongful death because judicial fiat cannot replace 
life or limb; neither life nor limb tangible or fungible. Accordingly, in the 
HMO environment, when breach of fiduciary duty leads to wrongful death or 
bodily injury, if the remedies are limited to those found in equity, then a 
worthy plaintiff s remedies are tantamount to no remedy at all. 
2. Compensatory Monetary Awards for Breach of Common Law 
Fiduciary Duty 
The common law of equity's  aversion to granting monetary awards for 
breach of fiduciary duty has never been absolute. 232 Under many situations 
an "equity court could 'establish purely legal rights and grant legal 
remedies which would otherwise be beyond the scope of its authority. "'233 
While equity recognized that monetary awards only need to be calculated 
with mathematical precision, 234 monetary awards were often needed to 
"make the victims of the breach whole."235 Accordingly, compensatory 
monetary awards have been provided for breach of fiduciary duty arising 
under protean circumstances. 236 Although money may not make the victim 
23 1 .  Coming regulations promulgated under authority of the Kcnnedy-Kasselbaum Act, Pub. 
L. No. 104- 1 9 1 ,  1 10 Stat 1 936 ( 1996) are expected to have civil and criminal penalties for breach 
of confidentiality associated with data contained in electronic medical records that are mandated 
by this Act. 
232. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 226 ( 1983) (mandating compensation 
for violations of fiduciary duties). 
233. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256 (quoting I JoHN N. POMEROY. EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1 8 1 , 
at 257 (5th ed. 1 941  )). 
234. In re: Club Dev. & Mgmt. Corp. v. Leonard, U.S. App. LEXIS 6 1 75, *9 ( 1 9 9 1 ). 
235. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 266 (White, J., dissenting). 
236. Thayer v. Domiano, 5 1 1  P.2d 84 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that monetary damages 
may be collected for misrepresentations); see also Gilbert v. Meyers, 362 F. Supp. 1 68 (1973) 
(holding that notice that application of a constructive trust can provide a vehicle for compensatory 
monetary award for violation of the security law); Clancy v. State Bar of Calif., 454 P.2d 329, 336 
(Cal. 1969) (ordering attorney to provide a restitutionary monetary award for breach of fiduciary 
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of bodily injury or wrongful death whole, money is a more appropriate 
form of equitable relief where there is bodily injury or wrongful death. 
If compensatory monetary damages are t? be awarded for patie.
nts 
injured by a medical director's breach of fiduciary duty, then the question 
arises as to how such damages should be calculated. We would fa�or 
determination of monetary awards for administrate malfeasance resultmg 
in bodily inJ:ury or wrongful death to be determined in a manner analogous 
to tort law, 37 because such a policy would minimize the need to redress a 
medical malpractice action as a breach of fiduciary duty for treating 
physicians. Conversely, even if a medical malpractice case were redressed 
as a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action, by granting a monetary award 
in a manner similar to medical malpractice, the discrepancy in awards 
would be minimized. Such a policy would also make a medical director 
liable to the same extent as a treating physician for a similar injury. 
Moreover, having a strong deterrent in place to check the medical 
director' s behavior would serve to remind the medical directors that they 
are first physicians and their decisions have the potential to cause real 
physical harm. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Physicians as primary treating physicians are liable when their 
decisions violate state medical malpractice standards or their state common 
law fiduciary duties. Pegram makes clear that physicians who also have 
administrative roles in HMOs are not covered by BRISA when making 
medical decisions and thus are also subject to the same liability as primary 
treating physicians. To the extent that treating physicians and medical 
directors are controlled by an HMO, or are found to be ostensible agents 
of an HMO, the HMO will share in their liability.238 Thus HMOs and other 
duty); Local no. 92, Int'l Ass ' n  of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Af'L...CIO v. 
Norris, 383 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1 967) (allowing monetary damages in addition to attorney fees); R.C. 
Gluck & Co. v. Tanke!, 21 1 N.Y.S.2d 602 (N.Y. App. Div. 1 96 1 )  (holding that even absent fraud, 
beneficiary may receive a monetary adjustment after fiduciary provides an accounting). 
237. The common law also allowed for the potential granting of punitive damages. "Although 
many older cases state that courts lack power in equity actions to award punitive damages, this 
increasingly [is an] antiquated view." Schoenholtz v. Doniger, 657 F. Supp. 899, 9 1 3  (S.D.N.Y. 
1 987) (citations omitted); see also Weems v. Jefferson-Pilot Lite Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d 905, 914 
(Ala. 1 995). In principle, we would favor the awardin1; of punitive damages in egregious cases 
where a physician's breach of fiduciary duty led to bodily injury. However, a discussion of punitive 
damages for breach of fiduciary duty is beyond the scope of this Article. 
238. Recently, Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 7 19 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. 1 999), has 
extended Lancaster's allowance for vicarious liability to reach all health plans. In Petrovich, the 
plaintiff alleged that the physician was negligent in failing to make a proper referral. Id. at 760. 
After experienc�n� intra-oral pain, the plaintiff went to see his PCP, who then referred the plaintiff 
to an ENT spec1ahst. /d. at 761 . Although the specialist recommended a further work-up, in what 
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managed care organizations that attempt to control medical care 
decisionmaking will have increased liability through the liability of their 
physicians. This should create pressure to improve patient care. At the 
same time, it will give plans that stay within the court's notion of the reach 
of ERISA an economic advantage through continuation of the ERISA 
preemption of state law regulation. Such plans must give up their control 
of physician decisionmaking, which reduces their ability to reduce costs, 
and must not hold the physicians out as their agents, which can hurt them 
in marketing. If the cost of litigation is too high, then there will be an 
incentive for plans to forgo the benefits of managing physician 
decisionmaking. Plans that choose this route will not give up cost controls. 
They will shift the cost of insurance to the physicians through capitation 
agreements that do not involve the plan in the decisions about individual 
patients. If they then though forgo medical director review of the decisions, 
that is, forgo quality control, they will escape state liability by explicitly 
ignoring quality of care issues. This threat must be addressed by state 
insurance regulators to avoid the paradox of avoiding liability by giving up 
quality control. 
is at present a recurrent pattern of conduct for PCPs in the managed care environment, the PCP 
overruled the specialist and clinical evaluation was terminated. Id. Over a year later, the plaintiff 
was found to have carcinoma of the tongue, which had spread into the pharynx and thereby, 
compromised any potential curative surgical procedures. Id. The court concluded that absent ERIS A 
preemption protections, an HMO "may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of its 
independent-contractor physicians under both the doctrines of apparent authority and implied 
authority." Id. at 775. This HMO liability is not based upon improper administrative action of the 
HMO, but rather the conduct of the physician providing medical service for the plan. ERISA 
preemption applies to harm to patients as a result of the administrative action. In contrast, delivery 
of medical service is not covered under ERISA. Thus, to the extent that a plan integrates 
administrative and medical services, it will be vicariously liable for the negligence of the medical 
service providers. This should extend to all plans with "branded" medical groups or other forms 
of integration of medical and plan administrative functions. 
